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Business, Human Rights, and the
Promise of Polycentricity
Jamie Darin Prenkert*
Scott J. Shackelford"

ABSTRACT

Special Representative of the Secretary-General on the
Issue of Human Rights and Transnational Corporationsand
Other Business Enterprises (SRSG) John Ruggie referred to the
"Protect, Respect, and Remedy" Framework (PRR Framework)
and the UN Guiding Principleson Business and Human Rights
(Guiding Principles) as a polycentric governance system.
However, the exact meaning of this phrase has not been very
carefully elucidated. This Article analyzes that description in
the context of the deep and varied body of literature on
polycentric governance and evaluates the PRR Framework in
that light. In particular,this Article uses a case-study approach,
analyzing the emerging polycentric governance system in the
context of the sourcing of certain minerals from conflict-affected
countries in the African Great Lakes region to explore these
issues. The conflict minerals regulatory regime incorporates a
notable number of the concerns and opportunities SRSG Ruggie
highlighted and promoted in the PRR Framework and Guiding
Principles. This Article then recommends further study of the
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concepts explored herein as applied to the business and human
rights sector generally and conflict minerals regulation
specifically. Ultimately, this Article argues that, given the
relative paucity of binding international law regulating the
human rights aspects of business and the unlikelihood of
substantial multilateralprogress in the near future, the success
of the PRR Framework and Guiding Principles may well
depend on whether the promise of their polycentric nature can
be fully realized.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In an era defined by globalization and the attendant rise of
multinational corporations,1 businesses are increasingly influencing
human rights practices around the world. 2 From recent disasters in
the Bangladeshi textile industry, in which more than 1,200 garment
workers died making clothing for Western firms, 3 to alleged human
rights abuses by subsidiaries of Canadian mining firms,4 the impact
of business on human rights cannot be underestimated. However,
given the relative lack of binding international law governing labor

See, e.g., THOMAS L. FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD is FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF
1.
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 9-10 (2006) (arguing that "the key agent of change, the
dynamic force driving global integration [through the year 2000], was multinational
companies").
2.
See The Global Human Rights Regime, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL.,
http://www.cfr.org/human-rights/global-human-rights-regime/p27450 (June 19, 2013),
[http://perma.cc/GSH7-AFVW] (archived Jan. 27, 2014) ("Many in the international
community are reassessing economic, social, and cultural rights as IGOs increasingly
link human rights to business practices and public health. Elsewhere, attention to the
rights of women, minorities, and persecuted ethnic groups has steadily increased.").
See Laura Neilson & Meenal Mistry, Feel-Good Fashion: The New Black,
3.
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 16, 2013, 6:00 PM), http://online.wsj.cominews/articles/
[http://perma.cc/BTQ2-KPUC]
SB10001424127887323977304579001150660068542
(archived Jan. 27, 2014) ("However, the issue has exploded in the past year after two
major factory disasters in Bangladesh together killed more than 1,200 garment
workers who were making clothes for Western companies.").

4.
See Priya Sarin, Canadian Mining Company May Be Held Liable for
Human Rights Abuses Committed Abroad By Its Foreign Subsidiaries, RABBLE.CA
(Aug. 1, 2013), http://rabble.calcolumnists/2013/08/canadian-mining-company-may-be[http://perma.cc/6J8P-YKCP]
held-liable-human-rights-abuses-committed-abroad-i
(archived Jan. 27, 2014) (describing human rights abuses such as "forcible evictions of
indigenous communities from disputed land, contamination of water supply,
assassination/disappearance of anti-mining activists, and rape of local women by
private security forces").
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practices in these industries, 5 the international community has
struggled to enforce human rights best practices. This absence of an
international legal framework has led to the development of novel
governance systems, an effort spearheaded by John Ruggie, special
representative of the secretary-general on the issue of human rights
and transnational corporations and other business enterprises
(SRSG).
During his mandate and after, SRSG Ruggie referred to the
"Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework (PRR Framework) and
the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights (Guiding
Principles) as a polycentric governance system. 6 However, the exact
meaning of this phrase has not been very carefully elucidated. This
Article analyzes that description in the context of a deep and varied
body of literature on polycentric governance and evaluates the PRR
Framework in that light. In particular, this Article uses a case-study
approach, analyzing the emerging polycentric governance system
related to the sourcing of certain minerals from conflict-affected
countries in the African Great Lakes region to explore these issues.
The conflict minerals regulatory regime incorporates a notable
number of the concerns and opportunities SRSG Ruggie highlighted
and promoted in the PRR Framework and Guiding Principles. This
Article then recommends further study of the concepts explored
herein as applied to the business and human rights sector generally
and conflict minerals regulation specifically. Ultimately, this Article
argues that, given the relative paucity of binding international law
regulating the human rights aspects of business and the unlikelihood
of substantial multilateral progress in the near future, the success of
the PRR Framework and Guiding Principles may well depend on
whether the promise of their polycentric nature can be fully realized.
The Article is structured as follows. Part I introduces the
literature on polycentric governance to provide a framework for
analysis. Part II applies the conceptual framework of polycentric
governance to the policy problem of conflict mineral regulation. Part

5.
See Drusilla K. Brown, Alan V. Deardorff & Robert M. Stern, Labor
Standards and Human Rights: Implications for InternationalTrade and Investment 2
(IPC Working Paper, Ser. No. 119, 2011) (describing different occasions when
"coordination of labor laws" was pursued but later abandoned).
6.
Specifically, Ruggie noted the following:
The overriding lesson I drew . . . was that a new regulatory dynamic was
required under which public and private governance systems .. . each come to
add distinct value, compensate for one another's weaknesses, and play
mutually reinforcing roles-out of which a more comprehensive and effective
global regime might evolve, including specific legal measures. International
relations scholars call this "polycentric governance."
E.g., JOHN G. RUGGIE, JUST BUSINESS: MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS AND HUMAN

RIGHTS 78 (2013).
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III concludes this Article with a discussion of the promise and pitfalls
of polycentric governance in advancing human rights in business.

II. BACKGROUND ON POLYCENTRIC GOVERNANCE SYSTEMS
Mapping the current state of a regulatory regime is a difficult
proposition, especially with the presence of many rapidly changing
variables. For example, in the context of cyber law, commentators
such as Professor Andrew Murray have argued for adopting dynamic
regulatory models, such as symbiotic regulation, to help better
understand this complex legal environment. 7 Other scholars have
turned to systems theory, which was first developed in the field of
biology to describe the relationships between parts of a system, such
as the human body. 8 Even under these approaches, however,
changing one element of the system can have "ripple effects"
throughout, 9 a phenomenon also noted by Professor Lon Fuller, who
advocated for a polycentric approach to conceptualize and manage
complex regulatory schemes.1 0
A critical aspect of understanding polycentric regulation is that
neither states nor any other entities enjoy sole rulemaking powers in
a given context, be it internet governance or multinational business
regulation. 11 For example, most definitions of law, including
Professor Fuller's description of law as "the enterprise of subjecting
human conduct to the governance of rules,"' 2 allow for overlapping
regulatory systems. Professor Fuller himself noted: "Multiple systems
do exist and have in history been more common than unitary
systems." 18 Some commentators define polycentric governance as

7.
See ANDREW W. MURRAY, THE REGULATION OF CYBERSPACE: CONTROL IN
THE ONLINE ENVIRONMENT, at xii, 250 (2007) (providing introductory and concluding
remarks on the theory of symbiotic regulation).
8.
See id. at 25-26 (describing system theory's application to study of the
human body, the gardener's dilemma, and other complex systems).
9.
Id. at 26 ("The system is 'caught in a web of conflicting constraints [in
which] each element of the system affects other parts of the whole system and changing
[a single element] will have affects which ripple throughout the system."' quoted in
STUART KAUFFMAN, AT HOME IN THE UNIVERSE 173 (1995)); see also David G. Post &
David R. Johnson, Chaos Prevailing on Every Continent: Towards a New Theory of
DecentralizedDecision-Making in Complex Systems, 73 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 1055, 107071 (1998) ("[T]he system can take any one of an astronomical number of different
configurations and may, via the 'ripple effects' of changes throughout the system,
respond to small changes of the state of those elements with large changes in whatever
system-wide variable we seek to measure.").
10.
See MURRAY, supra note 7, at 26-27 ("This is the ripple effect by Lon Fuller
and which he labelled 'polycentric."').
11.
See id. at 27-29 (explaining the "law of requisite variety" in which active
regulatory processes tend to overlap with each other and no one entity has sole
rulemaking power).
12.
Id. at 47 (quoting LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 106 (1964)).
13.
Id. (quoting LON FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW 123 (1964)).
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analogous to "non-statist law."1 4 However, such definitions miss some
of the unique aspects of polycentric governance, including its
emphases on self-organization and the notion that "diverse
organizations" and governments working at "multiple levels" can
create

policies

that

"increase

levels

of

cooperation . . . [and]

compliance."1 5 This Article defines polycentric governance generally
as a regulatory system-sometimes referred to as a regime
complex1 6-that consists of "a collective of partially overlapping and
nonhierarchical regimes."' 7 In order to understand the benefits and
drawbacks of a polycentric approach, it is first necessary to briefly
review the literature on regimes.

14.
Id. at 7 n.15 (citing Tom W. Bell, Polycentric Law, 7 HUMANE STUD. REV. 4
(1991-1992).
15.
Elinor Ostrom, A Polycentric Approach for Coping with Climate Change 12
(World Bank, Policy Research Working Paper No. 5095, 2009), available at
http://www.iadb.org/intallintalcdi/pe/2009/04268.pdf (listing four broad characteristics
for when cooperation governing the global commons (i.e., the international spaces
existing beyond national jurisdiction) is most likely to occur, "[including] the following:
(1) Many of those affected have agreed on the need for changes in behavior and see
themselves as jointly sharing responsibility for future outcomes; (2) The reliability and
frequency of information about the phenomena of concern are relatively high; (3)
Participants know who else has agreed to change behavior and that their conformance
is being monitored; and (4) Communication occurs among at least subsets of
participants"); see also Robert 0. Keohane & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for
Climate Change 3 (Harvard Project on Int'l Climate Agreements, Discussion Paper No.
10-33, 2010) (discussing regime complexes in the context of the climate change debate).
16.
See, e.g., Daniel H. Cole, From Global to Polycentric Climate Governance, 2
CLIMATE L. 395 (2011) (treating regime complex and polycentricity as practically the
same thing); Kal Raustiala & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic
Resources, 58 INT'L ORG. 277, 277-78 (2004) (noting the inherent complexity of
international regimes, the accompanying difficulties raised by that complexity, and
describing the regime complex for plant genetic resources); Scott J. Shackelford,
Governing the Final Frontier: A Polycentric Approach to Managing Space
Weaponization and Orbital Debris, 51 AM. BUS. L.J. 429 (2014) (noting the use of
regime complex as synonymous with polycentric governance); Shackelford, supra note
24 (noting use of regime complex).
17.
Raustiala & Victor, supra note 16, at 277; see also Scott J. Shackelford,
Toward Cyber Peace:Managing Cyber Attacks Through PolycentricGovernance, 62 AM.
U. L. REV. 1273 (2013) (representing the first publication of portions of this analysis);
cf. Michael D. McGinnis, An Introduction to lAD and the Language of the Ostrom
Workshop: A Simple Guide to a Complex Framework, 39(1) POL'Y STUD. J. 163, 171-72
(2011) (defining polycentric governance as "a system of governance in which authorities
from overlapping jurisdictions (or centers of authority) interact to determine the
conditions under which these authorities, as well as the citizens subject to these
jurisdictional units, are authorized to act as well as the constraints put upon their
activities for public purposes"); MURRAY, supra note 7, at xi (noting the complexities of
the cyber-regulatory theory).
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A. The Study of Regimes
According to Professor Oran Young, "Regimes are social
institutions governing the actions of those involved in specifiable
activities or sets of activities.... [T]hey are practices consisting of
recognized roles linked together by clusters of rules or conventions
governing relations among the occupants of these roles."18 Regimes
have two primary effects. First, they constrain the policy options of
actors.19 Second, they create rights.2 0 Nations respond to the concerns
of domestic politics when deciding the composition of a new regime.2 1
Yet even with a high degree of scientific and political agreement,
regulatory action may still be delayed as a result of differing
incentive structures among diverse stakeholders including states,
nongovernmental
organizations
(NGOs),
and
"epistemic
communities," which "are policy networks formed by [experts]
specializing in a particular policy area." 22 This can lead to deadlock,
and even if these diverse groups can agree on a new regime, the
result may still be suboptimal due to issues of consensus decision
making, ratification, and enforcement. 23 Various strategies may be
employed to address these problems, such as negotiating treaties with
incentive structures or sanctions to promote compliance, but often
such strategies are politically unpopular or prove insufficient. 24
Instead, regime complexes are formed as interim responses to help
manage complex global problems, such as promoting human rights. 25

18.
ORAN R. YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION: BUILDING REGIMES FOR
NATIONAL RESOURCES AND THE ENVIRONMENT 12-13 (Peter J. Katzenstein ed., 1989).
19.
See SUSAN J. BUCK, THE GLOBAL COMMONS: AN INTRODUCTION 30 (1998)

("[E]xisting institutions constrain policy options of individual actors.").
20.
See id. ("They may also establish rights, such as the right to conduct
research in the Antarctic, but these established rights are limited in eligibility and
exercise.").
21.
See Keohane & Victor, supra note 15, at 3, 18 (noting how regime
complexes adapt over time to a number of issues, including the conditions of domestic
politics).
22.
BUCK, supra note 19, at 8.
23.
See id. at 30-31 (discussing institutional analysis, institutional choice, and
the evolution of regimes in international relations); Eilene Galloway, Consensus
Decisionmaking by the United Nations Committee on the Peaceful Uses of Outer Space,
7 J. SPACE L. 3, 3-4 (1979) (describing the contours of consensus decision making); Liz
Klimas, Republicans Defeat Ratification of the U.N.'s 'Rights of Persons with
Disabilities' Treaty in Senate, THE BLAZE
(Dec. 4,
2012,
1:32 PM),
http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2012/12/04/republicans-defeat-ratification-of-the-u-n-srights-of-persons-with-disabilities-treaty-in-senate/#
[http://perma.cclHN6T-D8HF]
(archived Jan. 27, 2014) (reporting on the U.S. Senate's failure to ratify a disability
rights treaty that was "modeled after the Americans with Disabilities Act").
24.
See Keohane & Victor, supra note 15, at 12, 19 (identifying the different
approaches used to combat these problems along with a critical assessment of the
solutions' effectiveness).
25.
See id. at 10-11 (discussing regime complexes in the climate change
context).
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Regime complexes are created when several different regimes
''coexist in the same issue area without clear hierarchy," which can be
caused by different and continuously evolving political coalitions. 26
Given the multipolar state of international relations, 27 "loosely
coupled" regime complexes have significant advantages over unitary
regimes such as some UN consensus-driven multilateral treaties. 28
Building institutions is costly, and thus, leaders who invest in such
efforts often find it easier to work in smaller "clubs," such as the
Major Emitters Forum comprised of the largest greenhouse gas
(GHG) emitters, 29 rather than through forums with universal
membership like the UN Framework Convention on Climate
Change.3 0 Under these varying frameworks, the United Nations may
play the role of an umbrella organization or one component within a
regime complex rather than being the center of gravity for regulatory
efforts.3 1 As regime complexes become relatively more popular, efforts
to create flexible regimes will possibly supersede less practical efforts
to negotiate binding multilateral treaties.3 2
Comprehensive regimes are not without fault, however. As
interests, power, technology, and information change over time,
comprehensive regimes are difficult to form and, once formed, can be
unstable.3 3 An inflexible comprehensive regime could actually stifle
innovation by crowding out smaller scale efforts that might be more
effective at promoting human rights, as is discussed below. 34 There

26.
Id. at 4.
27.
See, e.g., Fareed Zakaria, Excerpt: Zakaria's 'The Post-American World and
The Rise of the Rest', NEWSWEEK, May 3, 2008, at 24, available at
http://www.newsweek.comlexcerpt-zakarias-post-american-world-89645
[http://perma.cc/WZ27-96SL] (archived Jan. 27, 2014) (explaining that geopolitical
power is shifting from the United States to other countries). But see Richard N. Haass,
The Age of Nonpolarity: What Will Follow U.S. Dominance, FOREIGN AFF., May-June
2008, at 44, 44 (arguing for the emergence of "a nonpolar international
system . . . characterized by numerous centers with meaningful power").
28.
See Keohane & Victor, supra note 15, at 2 ("Furthermore, such regime
complexes have some advantages over coherent, integrated regimes.").
29.
See id. at 3 (discussing the idea of "clubs" and why some state governments
choose to participate in them); Major Economies Forum on Energy and Climate, U.S.
DEP'T OF ST. (Sept. 15, 2011), http://www.state.gov/e/oes/climate/mem/index.htm
[http://perma.ccY36M-CBDZ] (archived Jan. 27, 2014) (providing details of the Major
Economies Forum).
30.
See Keohane & Victor, supra note 15, at 6 (describing the formation of these
kinds of "clubs" to cooperate on issues of climate change).
See id. at 23 (describing the "umbrella" nature of the UN involvement
31.
"under which many different efforts proceed").
32.
See Keohane & Victor, supra note 15, at 2 ("Efforts to create an integrated,
comprehensive regime are therefore unlikely to be successful and may even divert
attention from more practical efforts to create regime complexes.").
33.
See id. at 2-3 (explaining how the inflexibility of comprehensive treaty
systems tend to lead to their demise).
34.
See, e.g., Elinor Ostrom, Beyond Markets and States: Polycentric
Governance of Complex Economic Systems, 100 AM. EcON. REV. 641, 656 (2010) (noting
experiments that have documented this "crowding out" phenomenon).
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are also the costs of regime complexes to consider, including
enforcement, sustainability, and legal inconsistencies. 3 5 Consequently,
regime complexes must be critically assessed.
When analyzing regimes, according to Professors Robert
Keohane and David Victor, "it is helpful to imagine a continuum."3 6
Thick, comprehensive treaty systems such as the World Trade
Organization are "at one extreme," and "at the other extreme are
highly fragmented collections of institutions with no identifiable core
and weak or nonexistent linkages." 3 In between is a range of
semihierarchical regimes with "loosely coupled systems of
institutions."38 Comprehensive regimes are most common when the
interests of powerful actors are aligned "across a broad issue area."3 9
The potential comprehensive regime forming around the interests of
transnational businesses in respecting and promoting human rights
serves as an example of this phenomenon. 40 Such a level of agreement
and cooperation is rare in the international community, particularly
in an era increasingly defined by multipolar politics. 41 This has led to
a greater emphasis on targeted, issue-specific regimes, which are
discussed next in the context of polycentric analysis.

B. The Evolution of PolycentricAnalysis
Scholars from various disciplines have utilized the concept of
polycentricity in a number of different ways. According to Professor
Elinor Ostrom, "Polycentric systems are characterized by multiple
governing authorities at differing scales rather than a monocentric
unit."42 In a polycentric governance regime, therefore, the state is not
the only source or foundation of authority and, in fact, may play little

35.
See Keohane & Victor, supra note 15, at 4 (noting that "conflicts between
individual regulatory elements may be especially likely to arise"); Raustiala & Victor,
supra note 16, at 277-78 (2004) (noting the inherent complexity of international
regimes and the accompanying difficulties raised by that complexity).
36.
Keohane & Victor, supra note 15, at 3.
37.
Id.
38.
Id. at 4.
Id.
39.
40.
See, e.g., Jeremy Kirk, Russia Pushes for Online Code of Conduct at United
Nations General Assembly, COMPUTERWORLD UK (Oct. 3, 2011, 5:10 PM),
http://www.computerworlduk.com/news/public-sector/3307976/russia-pushes-for-onlinecode-of--conduct-at-united-nations-general-assembly/
[http://perma.cc/H35W-BB45]
(archived Jan. 27, 2014) (describing efforts of several countries, including Russia, to
promote a code of conduct that would promote peace and cybersecurity).
41.
See Abraham M. Denmark, Managing the Global Commons, WASH. Q., July
2010, at 165, 167 (discussing challenges to U.S. unilateral dominance of global
commons governance).
42.
Elinor Ostrom, Polycentric Systems for Coping with Collective Action and
Global Environmental Change, 20 GLOBAL ENvTL. CHANGE 550, 552 (2010).
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or no role at all.43 Instead, a complex array of interdependent entities
or decision-making centers, both state and nonstate, which may be
formally independent of one another, form networks and interact
among themselves. Ideally the entities each add some value while
reinforcing each other and compensating for each other's limitations
and weaknesses.44 Each entity within the system is typically free
from domination by the others; it can make its own rules and develop
its own norms within its domain of influence. 45 Nevertheless, there is
also opportunity within the system for "mutual monitoring, learning,
and adaptation of better strategies over time." 46
The shared problems or issues that concern multiple actors often
mark the boundaries of a polycentric governance regime. 47 In other
words, a polycentric system is focused on problem solving but is not
defined by any single or particular solution to that problem. 48 Often,
polycentric governance emerges in the face of a collective action
problem that a state is ill-equipped, unwilling, or too slow to tackle on
its own. 49 Professor Michael McGinnis explains that "[t]he basic idea
[of polycentric governance] is that any group .. . facing some
collective action problem should be able to address that problem in
whatever way they best see fit,"50 which can and should include
crafting new governance structures that will be able to facilitate the
problem-solving process. 5 ' In other words, "[a] system of governance
is fully polycentric if it facilitates creative problem-solving at all

43.
See Julie Black, Constructing and Contesting Legitimacy and
Accountability in PolycentricRegulatory Regimes, 2 REG. & GOVERNANCE 137, 137-38
(2008) ("[Polycentricl regimes are those in which the state is not the sole locus of
authority, or indeed in which it plays no role at all.").
44.
See Vincent Ostrom, Charles M. Tiebout & Robert Warren, The
Organizationof Government in MetropolitanAreas: A Theoretical Inquiry, 55 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 831, 831 (1961) ("[T]hey take each other into account in competitive
relationships, enter into various contractual and cooperative undertakings or have
recourse to central mechanisms to resolve conflicts.").
45.
See Ostrom, supra note 42, at 552 ("Each unit within a polycentric system
exercises considerable independence to make norms and rules within a specific
domain.").
46.
Id.
47.
See Black, supra note 43, at 137 ("Polycentric systems are marked by
fragmentation, complexity and interdependence between actors, in which state and
non-state actors are both regulators and regulated, and their boundaries are marked
by the issues or problems which they are concerned with, rather than necessarily by a
common solution.").
48.
Id.
49.
See Ostrom, supra note 15, at 10-13 (noting these characteristics in the
international attempts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions).
50.
Michael D. McGinnis, Costs and Challenges of Polycentric Governance: An
Equilibrium Concept and Examples from U.S. Health Care 1-2 (Ind. Univ. Vincent &
Elinor Ostrom Workshop in Pol. Theory & Pol'y Analysis Working Paper W11-3, 2011),
available at http://php.indiana.edu/-mcginnis/Beijing-core.pdf [http://perma.cc/NP563XZK] (archived Jan. 20, 2014).
51.
Id. ("[T]hey might work through the existing system of public authorities,
or they may establish a new governance unit[.]").
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levels." 52 In this way, such a multilevel, multipurpose, multitype, and
multisectoral model 53 lends itself to "bottom-up" rather than "topdown" governance. 54 If done correctly, by providing incentives to
systems where "large, medium, and small governmental and
nongovernmental enterprises engage in diverse cooperative as well as
competitive relationships," such a bottom-up approach can lower
transaction costs, more efficiently utilizing potentially scarce
resources.55
No one has likely done more to advance the study of polycentric
governance, especially as related to public goods and common-pool
resources, than Nobel laureate Elinor Ostrom, Vincent Ostrom, and
their colleagues at the Vincent and Elinor Ostrom Workshop in
Political Theory and Policy Analysis at Indiana University. 56 Their
early work in polycentric governance challenged the prevailing notion
in the 1970s and 1980s that the provision of public services, like law
enforcement and education, was improved and made more cost
effective by reducing the number of departments and districts and
consolidating them. 5 The Ostroms' work showed that "[n]o

52.
Id. at 3.
53.
See generally Michael D. McGinnis, An Introduction to LAD and the
Language of the Ostrom Workshop: A Simple Guide to a Complex Framework for the
Analysis of Institutions and Their Development (Ind. Univ. Research Paper No. 201102-01), available at http://php.indiana.edul-mcginnis/iad-guide.pdf [http://perma.cc/W8374TJS] (archived Jan. 27, 2014).
54.
See McGinnis, supra note 50, at 1 ("Bottom-up governance institutions are
typically characterized by a shared sense of legitimacy, high levels of community
participation, effective use of local information, and potential robustness in the face of
ever-changing challenges.").
55.
See Elinor Ostrom, Polycentric Systems as One Approach for Solving
Collective-Action Problems 3-4 (Ind. Univ. Vincent & Elinor Ostrom Workshop in Pol.
Theory & Pol'y Analysis Working Paper No. W08-6, 2008), available at
http://dlc.dlib.indiana.eduldlclbitstream/handle/10535/4417/W08-6_OstromDLC.pdf?
sequence=l [http://perma.cc/HT6D-PYAV] (archived Jan. 20, 2014) (citing Bruno S.
Frey & Reiner Eichenberger, FOCJ- Competitive Governments for Europe, 16 INT'L
REV. L. ECON. 315, 315 (1996)) (discussing the distinction between polycentric systems
and a "monocentric hierarchy"); see also Cole, supra note 16, at 405 (citing Ostrom,
supra note 15, at 33) (arguing that "[i]nstead of a 'monocentric hierarchy,' where
governmental units at higher levels make all the decisions, and units at lower levels
simply follow commands from above, a truly polycentric system is one in which
governmental units both compete and cooperate, interact and learn from one another,
and responsibilities at different governmental levels are tailored to match the scale of
the public services they provide").
56.
See generally Vincent & Elinor Ostrom Workshop Political Theory & Policy
Analysis,
INDIANA
UNIV.
BLOOMINGTON,
http://www.indiana.edul-workshop/
[http://perma.cc/J4SG-W84M] (archived Jan. 27, 2014) (last visited Feb. 1, 2014).
57.
See generally ELINOR OSTROM, ROGER B. PARKS & GORDON P. WHITAKER,
PATTERNS OF METROPOLITAN POLICING (1978) (reporting on a major study of police

organization in 80 metropolitan areas); E.A. Hanushek, The Economics of Schooling:
Productionand Efficiency in Public Schools, 24 J. ECON. LIT. 1141, 1167 (1986) (finding
no better performance in larger school districts); Roger B. Parks, Metropolitan
Structure and Systemic Performance: The Case of Police Service Delivery, in POLICY
IMPLEMENTATION IN FEDERAL AND UNITARY SYSTEMS 161 (Kenneth Hanf & Theo A.J.
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systematic empirical evidence supported reform proposals related to
moving the provision of public goods from smaller-scale units to
larger governments." 58 Rather, a series of studies showed, for
example, that small and medium-sized police departments
outperformed their larger counterparts serving similar neighborhoods
in major urban centers in measures of efficiency and cost. 59 Though
the small and overlapping centers of governance seemed inefficient,
in practice they performed well.60
Elinor Ostrom built on these studies to determine whether
polycentric governance regimes could adequately combat collective
action problems associated with the provision and regulation of
common-pool resources.6 1 She challenged the conventional theory of
collective action, 62 which held that rational actors would not
cooperate to achieve a socially optimal outcome in a prisoner's
dilemma scenario like that associated with the tragedy of the
commons. 63 Proponents of the conventional theory thought that only
Toonen eds., 1985) (finding that citizens in metropolitan areas with the most
fragmented provision of police service experienced more police presence on the street as
a function of tax expenditures than citizens living in areas with consolidated police
services); Paul Teske et al., Establishing the Micro Foundations of a Macro Theory:
Information, Movers, and the Competitive Local Market for Public Goods, 87 AM. POL.
ScI. REV. 702 (1993) (applying the Tiebout model of competition in the local market for
public goods to explain how an informed subset of consumers who are selective in their
choice of alternate suppliers of public goods can create competitive outcomes, which
helps explain how polycentric regions can produce greater efficiency).
58.
Ostrom, supra note 15, at 50 (emphasis omitted).
59.
See generally POLYCENTRICITY AND LOCAL PUBLIC ECONOMIES: READINGS
FROM THE WORKSHOP IN POLITICAL THEORY AND POLICY ANALYSIS (Michael D.

McGinnis ed., 1999), available at http://www.indiana.edu/-workshop/publications/
materials/volume2.html
[http://perma.cc/TR28-H2EW] (archived Jan. 27, 2014)
(collecting these studies).
60.
See generally id. (discussing results from studies of public economies).
61.
See Ostrom, supra note 15, at 10 (listing various projects and field
experiments focused on polycentric governance of common pool resources).
62.
The traditional theory of the collective action problem was first articulated
in the late 1960s by Mancur Olsen, an economist and social scientist from the
University of Maryland. See generally MANCUR OLSON, THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE
ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS (1965) (providing a comprehensive

explication of the collective action problem). Professor Olsen theorized that, "Only a
separateand 'selective' incentive will stimulate a rational individual in a latent group to
act in a group-oriented way." Id. at 51. In other words, members of a large group will
not act in the group's common interest unless the individual members have some
reason to expect personal gain (e.g., economic, social, reputational) from doing so.
63.
William Forster Lloyd first proposed the concept of the tragedy of the
commons in 1833 in his role as a fellow of the Royal Society. See Garrett Hardin, The
Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243, 1244 (1968). It was later more thoroughly
explicated and popularized by Garrett Hardin. See generally id. (providing an early,
thorough explanation of the tragedy of the commons). In its simplest form, the tragedy
of the commons suggests that when a population is given unrestricted access to a
resource, the resource is doomed to overexploitation. See, e.g., Scott J. Shackelford, The
Tragedy of the Common Heritage of Mankind, 28 STAN. ENvTL. L.J. 109, 118 (2009)
(discussing Hardin's explanation of the tragedy of the commons in the context of
international law).
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top-down, state-imposed regulations could create the proper
incentives for optimal collective action. 64 However, a series of field
studies that Ostrom and others conducted on the provision of water
resources in California, 65 the design and maintenance of irrigation
systems in Nepal, 66 and the protection of forests in Latin America 6 7
consistently showed that, "[c]ontrary to the conventional theory,"
many individuals will cooperate in the face of collective action
problems. 6 8 Local and regional groups of small-to-medium scale were
found to have self-organized to develop solutions "to common-pool
resource problems," despite what the rational choice theory would
suggest. 69 Moreover, in field studies, systems governed polycentrically
were often found to have better outcomes than those governed by a
central governmental authority.7 0 The polycentric regimes were more
nimble, flexible, and invested in guaranteeing success at the local
level, and regimes marked by top-down state regulation did not have
the kind of local and regional expert input that the polycentric
systems did. 71 These field observations were consistent with
laboratory experiments that found externally imposed regulations
that were intended to maximize joint returns in the face of collective
action problems actually "crowded out" individuals' voluntary

64.

As Ostrom notes:

Two broad grounds exist for doubting whether sole reliance on the conventional
theory of collective action is a wise scientific strategy. The first is the weakness
of empirical support for the conventional theory of collective action related to
small- to medium-size environmental social dilemmas. The second is the
existence of multiple externalities at small, medium, and large scales within
the global externality that has been of primary concern in the academic and
policy literature.
See Ostrom, supra note 15, at 9
65.
See, e.g., Elinor Ostrom, Public Entrepreneurship: A Case Study in Ground
Water Basin Management (1965) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univ. of Calif., Los
Angeles) (reporting a case study on the management of ground water).
66.
See generally IMPROVING IRRIGATION GOVERNANCE AND MANAGEMENT IN
NEPAL (Ganesh Shivakoti & Elinor Ostrom eds., 2002) (discussing the polycentric
governance of irrigation systems in Nepal).
67.
See, e.g., Elinor Ostrom & Harini Nagendra, Insights on Linking Forests,

Trees, and People from the Air, on the Ground, and in the Laboratory, 103 PRoc. NAT'L
AcAD. SCI. 4, 4-5 (2006) (detailing governance efforts at preserving forest resources in
Latin America).
68.
Ostrom, supra note 15, at 10.
69.
Id.
70.
See Elinor Ostrom, Polycentric Systems: Multilevel GovernanceInvolving a
Diversity of Organizations, in GLOBAL ENVIRONMENTAL COMMONS 105, 113-17 (E.
Brousseau et al., eds., 2012) (noting that, for example, "farmer-managed irrigation
systems" often outperformed "agency-managed irrigation systems" in Nepal).
71.
See id. at 113-17 ("While there is variance in the performance of Nepali
farmer-managed systems, few perform as poorly as government systems, holding other
relevant variables constant.").
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cooperative behavior.7 2 That is in part why Professor Ostrom has
argued that polycentric regulation is "the best way to address
transboundary problems . . . since the complexity of these problems

lends itself well to many small, issue-specific units working
autonomously as part of a network that is addressing collective-action
problems." 7 Polycentric governance, she concluded, "is an
application of the maxim, 'think globally, but act locally."' 74
Prior to her death, Elinor Ostrom was applying this research,
and the institutional analysis and development framework (LAD
framework)7 5 that grew out of it, to the regulation of global climate
change. She assumed that sufficient global regulation through a
treaty or another international legal instrument was not likely to
occur in the near future, if ever; 76 thus, she concluded that some
alternative means of regulating GHG emissions would be necessary
to address the collective action problem that emissions represent.
Professor Ostrom challenged the prevailing belief that atmospheric
conditions and climate, which are global common-pool resources,
must be addressed on a global scale to be effective.7 7 Rather, she
argued that because a tremendously "large number of actions taken
at multiple scales" 7 8-for example, the household, cities and states,
countries, transboundary regional areas, and global levels-affect the
amount of GHG emissions, a polycentric system addressing global
climate change would best incorporate the experience, expertise, and
investment of various actors at each of those scales and produce
effective, if not perfect, cooperative behavior.7 9 The basic notion in
this context is that "a single governmental unit" may be incapable of
dealing with "global collective action problems," like climate change
or, potentially, human rights abuses, in part because free riders

72.
See generally Bruno S. Frey & Felix Oberholzer-Gee, The Cost of Price
Incentives: An Empirical Analysis of Motivation Crowding-Out, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 746
(1999) (reporting an empirical analysis of crowding out behaviors); Ostrom, supra note
34, at 656 (citing Andrew F. Reeson & John G. Tisdell, Institutions, Motivations and
Public Goods: An Experimental Test of Motivational Crowding, 68 J. EcoN. BEHAVIOR
& ORG. 273 (2008)) (finding "externally imposed regulation that would theoretically
lead to higher joint returns 'crowded out' voluntary behavior to cooperate").
73.
Interview with Elinor
Ostrom,
Distinguished Professor, Indiana
University-Bloomington, in Bloomington, Ind. (Oct. 13, 2010).
74.
Id.
75.
For a basic discussion of the IAD Framework, see generally McGinnis,
supra note 17.
76.
See Ostrom, supra note 42, at 550 (noting some of the problems standing in
the way of global regulation through international agreement).
77.
See id. at 552 ("An important lesson is that simply recommending a single
governance unit to solve global collective-action problems-because of global impactsneeds to be seriously rethought.").
78.
Ostrom, supra note 15, at 14.
79.
See Ostrom, supra note 42, at 552-53 (noting the benefits of a polycentric
approach to reducing GHG emissions).
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discourage "trust and reciprocity" between stakeholders.so Nations
that are not bound, in other words, enjoy the benefits of other nations'
sacrifices without realizing the costs; solutions "negotiated at the
global level, if not backed by a variety of efforts at national, regional,
and local levels, . . . are not guaranteed to work well." 8 ' This is
somewhat similar to the interests that animate the "matching
principle" in international law. The matching principle requires
nations, and ultimately localities, to implement customary
international law principles as well as ratified treaties-a call for
multilevel action that is at the core of the polycentric thesis. 82
Polycentric governance's strengths are its capacity to embrace
self-regulation
and
bottom-up
initiatives,
its
focus
on
multistakeholder governance to foster collaboration across multiple
regulatory scales, and its emphasis on targeted measures to address
global collective action problems. On the positive side, the concept of
polycentrism encourages regulatory innovation and competition
between regimes as well as "flexibility across issues and adaptability
over time."83 On the negative side, however, polycentric networks are
susceptible to institutional fragmentation and gridlock caused by
overlapping authority that must still meet standards of coherence,

80.
Ostrom, supra note 15, at 35; see Keohane & Victor, supra note 15, at 9
(discussing the feasibility of managing diverse problems within the climate change
context with various institutions).
81.
Ostrom, supra note 15, at 4.
82.
See, e.g., Ramses Wessel & Jan Wouters, The Phenomenon of Multilevel
Regulation: Interactions Between Global, EU and National Regulatory Spheres, in
MULTILEVEL REGULATION AND THE EU: THE INTERPLAY BETWEEN GLOBAL, EUROPEAN
AND NATIONAL NORMATIVE PROCESS 9, 20 (Andreas Follesdal et al. eds., 2008) (noting
how regulations promulgated by international organizations like the WTO have a
binding effect on other legal orders like the European Union, its member states, and
even individuals); Jonathan R. Macey & Henry N. Butler, Externalities and the
Matching Principle:The Case for Reallocating EnvironmentalRegulatory Authority, 14
YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 23, 25 (1996) (developing the matching principle). However, the
matching principle assumes the desirability of matching a particular jurisdiction with
the scope of a given problem, which may be appropriate in some contexts but goes
against the literature on polycentric governance as applied to the global commons
insofar as the latter argues for the desirability of multisector and multitype action at
multiple scales. Compare Jonathan H. Adler, Jurisdictional Mismatch in
Environmental Federalism, 14 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 130, 133 (2005) ("By matching
jurisdiction with the scope of a given problem, the institutional structure can ensure
the greatest 'match' between a given problem and the institutional response."), with
Ostrom, supra note 15, at 4 (arguing in the climate change context that "given the
importance of technological change, without numerous innovative technological and
institutional efforts at multiple scales, we may not even begin to learn which combined
sets of actions are the most effective in reducing the long-term threat of massive
climate change").
83.
Keohane & Victor, supra note 15, at 18; see also Constantine
Michalopoulos, WTO Accession, in DEVELOPMENT, TRADE AND THE WTO: A HANDBOOK
61, 61-70 (Bernard M. Hoekman et al. eds., 2002) (discussing the benefits of
polycentric regulation in the context of WTO accession).
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effectiveness, and sustainability. 84 In other words, confusion and
delay may result because no one person or organization is ultimately
in control. 85 There are also moral and political problems at play,
including an application of Professor Hardin's "lifeboat ethics"8 6 and
an unwillingness of some states to be politically pressured in smaller
forums.
Thus, notwithstanding the drawbacks of polycentric governance,
problems that transcend the Westphalian conception of national
jurisdictional boundaries,8 7 like those posed by the tragedy of the
commons, need not necessarily be addressed only by comprehensive
global regulation or international law. Rather, loosely linked regime
complexes that avoid fragmentation "can be much more flexible and
adaptable than integrated-comprehensive regimes." 88 Polycentric
regulatory action by multiple actors at multiple levels linked together
by diverse information networks may be preferable to failed or
lumbering international initiatives and could even bring benefits that
top-down regulation cannot-a possibility explored in the next
subpart.

84.
See Keohane & Victor, supra note 15, at 2, 18-19, 25 (noting these
challenges and stating that "[i]ndeed, dispersed institutions can also be associated with
chaos, a proliferation of veto points and gridlock that deters policy makers and private
investors from devoting resources to the climate change problem").
85.
See Ostrom, supra note 42, at 554-55 (reviewing some of the objections to
relying on polycentric governance to address global climate change, including "leakage,
inconsistent policies, inadequate certification, gaming the system, and free riding").
86.
Garrett Hardin, Lifeboat Ethics: The Case Against Helping the Poor,
123-24,
126,
available at
Sept.
1974,
at
38-40,
PSYCHOL.
TODAY,
http://www.dces.wisc.eduldocuments/ies-112/Hardin%201974%201ifeboat%20ethics.pdf
[http://perma.ccl64NW-ZGLK] (archived Jan. 27, 2014) (examining, from an ethical
viewpoint, when swimmers surrounding a lifeboat should be taken aboard).
87.
Westphalian ideas of national sovereignty, in which a sovereign has
absolute power within its own territory, are traced to the Peace of Westphalia of 1648,
which ended the Thirty Years' War. Antony Anghie, InternationalLaw in a Time of
Change: Should InternationalLaw Lead or Follow?, 26 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1315,
1335-36 (2010-2011). Though recent studies of the Peace of Westphalia suggest that
this understanding is a misinterpretation, it had significant influence over centuries of
international relations and the development of international law. Id.
Keohane & Victor, supra note 15, at 25.
88.
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C. Applying Polycentricity to Business and Human Rights
SRSG Ruggie recognized similar challenges and opportunities as
he undertook his mandate to address human rights and transnational
corporations. The likelihood that corporate responsibility for human
rights could be enshrined in some sort of comprehensive and binding
instrument of international law or treaty was nil.89 The most recent
attempt to do so was embodied in the Norms on the Responsibilities
of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with
Regard to Human Rights (Norms), which would have imposed on
businesses affirmative duties concurrent with states "to promote,
secure the fulfillment of, respect, ensure respect of and protect
human rights" within their "sphere of influence."90 The controversy
surrounding the Norms is well known. They failed to get any traction
at the United Nations. 91 Ultimately, the UN Human Rights
Commission took no action on the Norms and instead established
SRSG Ruggie's mandate. 92 Ruggie recognized that the Norms were
both too ambitious and too limited in their scope and that there was
no hope to build consensus around an approach that imposed statelike duties with regard to some delimited set of human rights directly
on businesses at the level of international law. 93 Therefore, early in
his mandate, SRSG Ruggie made clear his intent to distance his
efforts from the Norms. In his words, Ruggie's "first official act was to
commit 'Normicide."' 94 Thus, as with global climate change, it would
be folly to look to a top-down approach to regulate transnational
corporations with regard to human rights violations and abuses.
Still, globalization has created a dynamic whereby transnational
corporations operate beyond the reach of any particular national
regulatory system. Governance gaps result from inadequate national
regulatory reach, a nonexistent international regulatory framework,
and insufficiently organized and empowered nonstate actors. The

RUGGIE, supra note 6, at 47-60 (discussing the failure of the Norms on the
89.
Responsibilities of Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with
Regard to Human Rights).
Comm'n on Human Rights, Sub-Comm'n on Promotion & Protection of
90.
Human Rights, Working Group, Norms on the Responsibilities of Transnational
Corporations and Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/12/Rev.2 (2003).
See John H. Knox, The Human Rights Council Endorses "Guiding
91.
Principles" for Corporations, ASIL INSIGHTS (Aug. 1, 2011), http://www.asil.org/
insights/volume/15/issue/21/human-rights-council-endorses-"guiding-principles"corporations [http://perma.cc/566G-BC281 (archived Jan. 20, 2014) ("[The Draft Norms
proved to be controversial. While human rights groups strongly supported them, most
corporations opposed them, and the governments on the Human Rights Commission
decided not to adopt them.").
92.
See generally RUGGIE, supra note 6 (providing a comprehensive discussion
of the history and origin of the SRSG mandate).
93.
Id. at 47-60.
94.
Id. at 54.
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PRR Framework was crafted to address and fill those governance
gaps. 95 The gaps take several forms. Structurally, public governance
is fragmented along national territorial lines, while the global
economy transcends such territorial boundaries.9 6 Even within and
among those national jurisdictions, governments lack policy
coherence on both vertical and horizontal axes.9 7 Finally, states often
lack the capacity or will to implement or adopt regulatory measures
because they fear either that they lack the means to enforce them or
that they, or domestic firms, will suffer negative consequences in the
global marketplace.98 With regard to policy coherence and governance
gaps, in 2010, Ruggie identified five key ways that states could more
effectively and coherently meet their duty to protect:
(a) safeguarding their own ability to meet their human rights
obligations; (b) considering human rights when they do business with
business; (c) fostering corporate cultures respectful of rights at home
and abroad; (d) devising innovative policies to guide companies
operating in conflict affected areas; and (e) examining the cross-cutting
99
issue of extraterritorial jurisdiction.

Thus, states clearly have a vital role to play in addressing these
governance gaps, but they cannot by themselves completely close the
governance gaps created by globalization.
In the absence of obligatory international law and in light of the
governance gaps SRSG Ruggie identified, a polycentric system of
The PRR
governance and regulation can presumably thrive.
Framework was conceived as just such a polycentric system. When
asked about the interaction between the state's duty to protect and
business's responsibility to respect human rights, Ruggie indicated
that the framework and the guiding principles reflect a system of
Rep. of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and
95.
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Protect, Respect and
Remedy: A Frameworkfor Business and Human Rights, Hum. Rts. Council, 1 106, U.N.
Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008) (by John Ruggie) ("How to narrow and ultimately bridge
the [governance] gaps in relation to human rights is our fundamental challenge.").
See id. 2 (noting that today the "scope and power [of markets] far exceed
96.
the reach of the institutional underpinnings that allow them to function smoothly and
ensure their political sustainability").
Id.
33. Vertical incoherence occurs when a state adopts a human rights
97.
obligation-for instance, through legislation-but fails to give sufficient regard or effort
to its implementation. Id. Horizontal incoherence occurs when states regulate in one
area in isolation (e.g., securities regulation or labor) with little regard for how that
interacts with or affects regulatory efforts elsewhere in the government. Id.; John G.
Ruggie, Special Rep. for Bus. & Human Rights, Keynote Address at the 3d Annual
Responsible Investment Forum (Jan. 12, 2009) [hereinafter Ruggie, Keynote Address]
at http://www.reports-and-materials.org/Ruggie-address-to(transcript available
Responsible-Invest-Forum-12-Jan-2009.pdf).
Ruggie, Keynote Address, supra note 97.
98.
Special Rep. of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and
99.
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Business and Human
Rights: Further Steps Toward Operationalization of the "Protect, Respect, Remedy"
Framework, 19, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/27 (Apr. 9, 2010) (by John Ruggie).
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polycentric governance. He described it as "an emerging regulatory
dynamic under which public and private governance systems each
add distinct value, compensate for one another's weaknesses, and
play mutually reinforcing roles-out of which a more comprehensive
and effective global regime might emerge." 100 Referencing the
polycentric nature of the framework, Professor Larry Backer
describes it as "an attempt to build simultaneous public and private
governance systems as well as coordinate, without integrating, their
operations." 10 1 In other words, the PRR Framework serves as a
means of providing the information networks and linkages that allow
for multiple actors at multiple levels of society to act as governing
authorities within their particular realms of expertise and influence
while reinforcing each other and compensating for each other's
limitations and weaknesses. 102 Furthermore, it incorporates the
matching principle at both a legal and a social regulatory level.' 0 3
The problem of business's involvement or complicity in human rights
violations and abuses is a multilevel one, ranging from the purely
local to the transnational. By complementing the state's duty to
protect with business's responsibility to respect human rights, as well
as explicating the role that both state and nonstate actors must play
in remedying any violations or abuses, the PRR Framework
anticipates a broad, multilevel approach and provides guidance on
how all involved can contribute to addressing the problem at their
respective levels.

100.
Interview by Bus. & Human Rights Resource Ctr. with John Ruggie,
Special Rep. for Bus. & Human Rights, at Berne Declaration (Nov. 2011), available at
http://www.business-humanrights.org/medialdocuments/berne-declaration-interviewruggie-nov-2011.pdf.
101.
Larry CatA Backer, On the Evolution of the United Nations' "ProtectRespect-Remedy" Project: The State, the Corporation and Human Rights in a Global
Governance Context, 9 SANTA CLARA J. INT L L. 37, 43 (2011).
102.
See supra note 44 and accompanying text (noting the complementary and
mutually reinforcing nature of polycentric institutions).
103.
See supra note 82 and accompanying text for a discussion of the matching
principle.
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III. CONFLICT MINERALS AND POLYCENTRIC GOVERNANCE
"The Democratic Republic of the Congo is a vast country, the size of
western Europe and home to sixty million people. For decades it was
known for its rich geology, which includes large reserves of cobalt,
copper, and diamonds, and for the extravagance of its dictator Mobutu
Sese Seko, but not for violence or depravity. Then, in 1996, a conflict
began that has thus far cost the lives of over five million people."
-Jason K. Stearns

104

The polycentric nature of the PRR Framework is an important and
elegant feature of SRSG Ruggie's work. The ultimate success or
failure of the PRR Framework and Guiding Principles depends upon
whether they will spawn well-functioning, issue-specific polycentric
governance regimes. This Part is devoted to a case study of an
emerging, issue-specific, polycentric governance regime. Because it
emulates the ideals for a polycentric system, incorporates the norms
elucidated in the Guiding Principles, and confronts a number of the
most troublesome governance gaps, the approach to supply chain
transparency and conflict minerals in the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC) may well portend how lasting and meaningful the PRR
Framework and Guiding Principles will be.
A. Backgroundon the Conflict Minerals Issue
Significant swaths of the African continent are rich in natural
resources but poor in stable governance, the hallmarks of civil society,
and the rule of law. In these areas, local communities are often
dominated-and even terrorized-by outside interests that seek to
extract the value from those resources for their own gain with little
regard for the effect on the local peoples. 105 The effects are
devastating. Such groups can and do wreak havoc on the local
populations and the environment, leave the community without a
lucrative source of support, and rob communities of the right to selfdetermination. These interlopers can range from warlords and
terrorists to knights of industry, sometimes, wittingly or not, working
in concert.
In the eastern DRC, armed rebel groups, as well as some groups
loosely affiliated with the official DRC military, profit and fund their
operations in part through the domination and control of mineral
mines as well as the unauthorized extortive taxation of trade routes

104.
JASON K. STEARNS, DANCING IN THE GLORY OF MONSTERS: THE COLLAPSE
OF THE CONGO AND THE GREAT WAR OF AFRICA 4 (2011).
105.
See, e.g., id. at 82 ("The province [of Katanga] harbored some of the richest
mineral deposits in Africa, prompting Belgian businessmen to back a bid for secession
of the province when the Congo became independent").
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and facilities.1 0 6 In turn, some of these groups terrorize the local
populations, taking particular aim at women and girls.1 07 They use
rape as a tool of control and intimidation, making the eastern DRC
perhaps the most dangerous place in the world to be female.10 8
The origins of the human rights travesty in the DRC are well
known. Fighting between and among the armed rebel groups and
government forces has led to the deaths of more than five million
since the mid-1990s when the aftermath of the Rwandan genocide
spilled across the border into the eastern DRC. 0 9 It is a zone of weak
or nonexistent governance and nearly constant conflict.
No doubt such conflict is expensive. Thus, the DRC's vast supply
of natural resources, estimated to be on the order of $24 trillion,110 is
a natural source for rebel groups to tap for funding. The UN Security
Council adopted a resolution in 2005 recognizing the link between
illegal exploitation of natural resources, illicit trade in those
resources, and arms trafficking as a significant factor exacerbating
the continuing conflicts in the region. "I The armed groups'
occupation and exploitation of the mineral mines have provided a rich
source of funding for guns, ammunition, and other conflict-sustaining
supplies. Along with gems and other precious metals, the DRC has a
rich supply of gold, cassiterite, wolframite, and coltan.112 The latter
three minerals are refined into the metals tin, tungsten, and
tantalum.1 13 Gold, tin, tungsten, and tantalum are widely used in
numerous industries, but they are particularly important in the

106.
See Delphine Schrank, Tin Fever, VA. Q. REV., Fall 2010, at 24, 32
(describing the interlocking military and rebel groups engaging in this type of
exploitation
at
a
cassiterite
mine
in
eastern
DRC),
available at
http://www.vqronline.org/essay/tin-fever [http://perma.cc/FLD9-34YB] (archived Jan.
27, 2014).
107.
See generally Fiona Lloyd-Davies, Why Eastern DR Congo Is 'Rape Capital
of the World,' CNN Gast updated Nov. 25, 2011), http://www.cnn.com/
2011/11/24/worldlafricaldemocratic-congo-rape/ [http://perma.cc/T7DX-V2VV] (archived
Jan. 27, 2014) (discussing the difficult choices women in the DRC face-to "stay home
and face starvation" or venture "out to the fields for food and be raped").
108.
See generally Amber Peterman, Tia Palermo & Caryn Bredenkamp,
Estimates and Determinants of Sexual Violence Against Women in the Democratic
Republic of Congo, 101 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 1060 (2011) (reporting on a study of sexual
violence in the DRC that estimates "rape among women aged 15 to 49 years in the 12
months prior to the survey[, which] translate[s] into approximately 1150 women raped
every day, 48 women raped every hour, and 4 women raped every 5 minutes").
109.
See generally GERARD PRUNIER, AFRICA'S WORLD WAR: CONGO, THE
RWANDAN GENOCIDE, AND THE MAKING OF A CONTINENTAL CATASTROPHE (2009)
(providing an exhaustive account of the history of the "African World War").
110.
What Happens When the Sleeping Giant of Congo Awakes, AFRICAN GLOBE
(July 2, 2013), http://www.africanglobe.net/business/sleeping-giant-congo-awakes/
[http://perma.cclJVV8-BUPN] (archived Jan. 27, 2014).
111.
S.C. Res. 1635, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1635 (Oct. 28, 2005).
112.
See JOHN PRENDERGAST & SASHA LEZHNEV, FROM MINE TO MOBILE PHONE:
THE CONFLICT MINERALS SUPPLY CHAIN 1, available at http://www.enoughproject.org/
files/publications/minetomobile.pdf (outlining the conflict minerals supply chain).
113.
Id. at 9 n.4.
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production of electronic devices.1 14 Cell phones, laptop computers,
and digital video cameras, among others, rely on these minerals for
their operation."15 Gold is used for wire coating. 116 Tin is a soldering
agent." 7 Tungsten makes cell phones vibrate."18 Tantalum capacitors
store electricity in electronic devices.1 9 These minerals have been
dubbed "conflict minerals" to denote their role in the ongoing conflict
and unrest in the Great Lakes Region of Africa, particularly in the
DRC.120 Though the DRC is not the sole-or even majority-supplier
of these conflict minerals, their abundance has made the DRC a
major global supplier. 121
Artisanal mining is perhaps dangerous enough in and of itself for
the local miners and the environment of the eastern DRC, but the
violence and terror that the military and paramilitary groups inflict
exacerbate these difficulties of life.1 22 Only a multifaceted strategy of
international pressure, support, and cooperation at the political,
military, social, and economic levels has any hope to produce any
long-lasting successful resolution to the tragedies caused by these
entrenched and conflicting interests. Nonetheless, at least some part
of the solution has to address the role that foreign businesses play in
the cycle of conflict and violence. Markets create value in the
minerals. That value drives the unauthorized exploitation of the
mines and the local populations. Those value-creating markets would
not exist without demand for the products that incorporate the
minerals. Though the electronics manufacturers and consumers may
be geographically far removed from the DRC mines, it would be
shortsighted to ignore their role in any comprehensive strategy for
bringing stability to the DRC.

114.
Id. at 1.
115.
See Edward Wyatt, Use of "Conflict Minerals" Gets More Scrutiny from
U.S., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 20, 2012, at Bl, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2012/03/20/business/use-of-conflict-minerals-gets-more-scrutiny.html?_r=0
[http://perma.cc/BR5L-FMQS] (archived Jan. 27, 2014) (describing the vital place of
conflict minerals in the electronics industry, among others).
116.
Id.
117.
Tin:
Statistics
and
Information,
U.S.
GEOLOGICAL
SURV.,
http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/commodity/tin/
[http://perma.cc/XKF4-96JL]
(archived Jan. 27, 2014) (last modified Nov. 1, 2013).
118.
Tristan McConnell, Is Your New Mobile Phone Made with Conflict
Minerals?, GLOBALPosT,
http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/africa/101214/mobilephones-iphone-congo-war-conflict-minerals [http://perma.cc/45Z7-QV26 (archived Jan.
27, 2014) (last updated Dec. 19, 2010).
119.
Id.
120.
See Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274, at 56,275 n.6 (Sept. 12, 2012) (to
be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 240 & 249b) (referring to Dodd-Frank's definition of
conflict minerals, which includes gold, casiterite, wolframite, and coltan).
121.
See generally PRENDERGAST & LEZHNEV, supra note 112 (noting the scale of
the DRC's conflict mineral trade).
122.
For a description of the complex corruption and intimidation related to, as
well as harrowing experience of miners at, cassiterite mining operations at the Bisie
mine in North Kivu province in the DRC, see generally Schrank, supra note 106.
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As such, the conflict minerals issue embodies the governance
gaps that Ruggie identified as plaguing the business and human
rights space.1 23 The Congolese government lacks sufficient capacity to
deal with the issue because of its recent history-and, in some parts
of the country, its current threat-of bloody and devastating
violence.124 Even if the Congolese government's capacity were not so
limited, the complexity of the supply chain for these minerals is such
that the challenge presented by legal fragmentation and the
conundrum of extraterritorial application of any one nation's laws to
a global industry is writ large. The number of actors involved in the
process from the mine to the finished product is significant; 2 5 the
number of home and host states that are touched by those actors'
commercial activities is daunting. The situation presents a classic
collective action problem 126 in that it takes a cooperative,
comprehensive approach to starve the rebel groups of their sources of
income. Defectors who continue to buy from conflict-affected mines
and to fund the rebel groups can undermine governance efforts. Thus,
any governance regime needs to be innovative, be adaptive, build
trustworthiness and cooperation among the affected actors, and work
at multiple scales. A polycentric approach is warranted.
In fact, a polycentric governance regime focused on supply chain
transparency and due diligence and intended to limit the access of
rebel groups to the deep pockets of the global market has emerged.
The regime incorporates norms that are consistent with and, perhaps,
inspired by the PRR Framework and Guiding Principles.' 2 7 This
polycentric regime involves a growing network of state and nonstate
regulators acting interdependently to complement each other and to
add value with their strengths while counterbalancing each other's
weaknesses.
The causes and continuing dynamics that fuel the instability in
the eastern DRC and lead to the gross human rights abuses are
many. It is unlikely that halting illicit trade in conflict minerals will,
by itself, remedy all that afflicts the region. Nonetheless, the success
or failure of the efforts to curb the trade in rebel-financing conflict

123.
See supra notes 95-99 and accompanying text (describing the concept of
governance gaps and noting specific governance gaps present in the role of businesses
in protecting against human rights abuses).
124.
See generally PRUNIER, supra note 109 (providing background on the recent
and ongoing conflict in the DRC).
125.
See infra note 210 and accompanying text (describing the complexity of the
supply chain for just one mineral for just one company).
126.
See supra notes 62-63 and accompanying text (giving the basic theory of
the collective action problem and the tragedy of the commons).
127.
See Mark B. Taylor, The Ruggie Framework:PolycentricRegulation and the
Implications for Corporate Social Responsibility, 5 ETIKKI I PRAKSIs: NORDIc J.
APPLIED ETHICS 9, 23-25 (2011) (discussing how the Ruggie idea of due diligence and
reporting-"knowing and showing"-has been incorporated in the approach to conflict
minerals).
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minerals may provide some evidence for how a polycentric approach
to issues of business's participation and complicity in violations of
human rights will fare.
B. Independent Actors and Decision-MakingCenters
Affecting Conflict Minerals
While it is outside the scope of this Article to give a complete
account of all the various actors in this emerging governance regime,
it is worthwhile to map some of the activities of the major state and
nonstate players at various levels in the process. After creating this
map, this Article will consider whether well-intentioned, state-based
legislative action will "crow[d] out" the voluntary, cooperative
creation of a truly effective polycentric system of governance 2 8 or
whether the legislation will catalyze the propagation of various
regulatory and decision-making centers to more quickly create a fully
polycentric regime. Ultimately, careful field study and application of
mature analytical tools, such as the IAD framework from the Ostrom
Workshop, 2 9 will be necessary to measure the effectiveness of these
efforts and to improve and encourage subsequent initiatives. The
PRR Framework's legitimacy and longevity will likely hang on the
success of these types of efforts.
1.

National-Level State Actor: U.S. Conflict Minerals Legislation
and SEC Regulation

At the urging of several civil society NGOs, most notably the
Enough Project and Global Witness, 13 0 the U.S. Congress took notice
of the conflict mineral supply chain. In 2010, Congress somewhat
uncomfortably included § 1502,131 which addresses conflict minerals,
within the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act (Dodd-Frank Act),1 32 a financial reform bill. Section 1502's goal is
to starve the armed rebel groups of the essential funding source that
comes from trading in conflict minerals.1 33

128.
See supra note 72 and accompanying text (discussing the problem of central
regulation crowding out creative, voluntary cooperative behavior).
129.
See generally McGinnis, supra note 17 (describing the LAD framework and
the language of the Ostrom Workshop).
130.
See Taylor, supra note 127, at 24 ("In the United States, advocacy
organisations such as Enough and Global Witness had managed to raise attention to
the issue of conflict minerals with legislators.").
131.
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (Dodd-Frank
Act), Pub. L. No. 111-203, § 1502, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified as amended at 15
U.S.C. § 78m(p) (2012).
Dodd-Frank Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010) (codified in
132.
scattered sections of the U.S. Code).
Id. § 1502(a).
133.
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Without banning the purchase or use of conflict minerals from
the DRC or its neighbors, even if the minerals can be shown to have
funded armed rebels, § 1502 instead incorporates the due diligence
and reporting norm that SRSG Ruggie says requires companies to
"know and show" that they are respecting human rights. 134 Congress
chose to force companies to disclose information about their behavior
and choices rather than to regulate that behavior directly. Section
1502 regulates the flow of information in three complementary
ways. 135 First, it affects publicly traded corporations and their
activities by requiring that they engage in due diligence and
reporting about their sourcing of conflict minerals. In addition, it
directs government officers, including the secretary of state, the
comptroller general of the United States, and the secretary of
commerce, to assist in the compilation and sharing of information
related to conflict minerals trade. The U.S. State Department is
required to create a map detailing mines, routes, and facilities that
are controlled by armed rebel groups. The comptroller general and
the secretary of commerce are charged with reporting to Congress on
aspects of the effectiveness of the reporting requirements, including
the activities of firms not required to file conflict minerals reports.
i.

Due Diligence, Reporting, and Disclosure

Most significantly, § 1502 forces certain companies-primarily
publicly traded technology, automotive, mining, jewelry, and
aerospace companies-to disclose to the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) and to make available through their websites
information related to their supply chain monitoring and use of
conflict minerals. Specifically, the covered companies must disclose
and make available through their websites whether conflict minerals
that are "necessary to the functionality or production of a product"
they manufacture originated in the DRC or the countries sharing an
internationally recognized border with the DRC (i.e., Angola,
Burundi, the Central African Republic, the Republic of Congo,
Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia). 136 In addition, the
companies must provide "a description of the measures taken . .. to
exercise due diligence on the source and chain of custody of conflict

134.
See RUGGIE, supra note 6, at 99 ("To discharge the responsibility to respect
human rights requires that companies develop the institutional capacity to know and
show that they do not infringe on others' rights.").
135.
See generally Christiana Ochoa & Patrick J. Keenan, Regulating
Information Flows, Regulating Conflict: An Analysis of United States Conflict Minerals
Legislation, 3 GOETTINGEN J. INT'L L. 129, 134-37 (2011) (describing the conflict
minerals legislation and the legislation's objectives).

136.

15 U.S.C. § 78m(p)(2)(B).
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minerals."' 3 7 Companies must also submit to the SEC a private audit
of those efforts, as well as
a description of the products manufactured or contracted to be
manufactured that are not DRC conflict free. .. [and] the facilities used
to process the conflict minerals, the country of origin of the conflict
minerals, and the efforts to determine the mine or location of origin
138
with the greatest possible specificity.

To be "DRC conflict free," a product cannot contain minerals "that
directly or indirectly finance or benefit armed groups in the [DRC] or
an adjoining country."*39 Essentially, covered companies must audit
their supply chains to ensure that the mines from which the minerals
are extracted, the trade routes, and the trading facilities through
which the minerals pass are neither under the control of nor
financing armed groups.
In August 2012, following an extensive and extended notice and
comment period, the SEC issued its final rule on the conflict minerals
provision, implementing the Dodd-Frank Act requirements.1 40 The
final rule, numbering more than 300 pages, lays out a three-step
process for covered companies to determine whether and what to
report regarding their use of conflict minerals and the minerals'
origin.141 Figure 1 provides a flowchart of the processes.

137.
138.
139.
140.
C.F.R. pts.
141.

Id. § 78m(p)(1)(A)(i).
Id. § 78m(p)(1)(A)(ii).
Id. §78m(p)(1)(D).
Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274 (Sept. 12, 2012) (to be codified at 17
240 & 249b).
Id.
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Figure 1. Conflict Minerals Flowchart
Source: Securities and Exchange Commission (Conflict Minerals, 77
Fed. Reg. 56,274, 56,283 (Sept. 12, 2012))
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The three steps of the rule's approach can be summarized as
follows:
First Step: A company must determine if it is subject to the
rule.1 42 Only those companies for which conflict minerals are
necessary to the functionality or production of a product they
manufacture are covered.1 43 If a company does not fall within
this definition, it need not engage in any further investigation or
due diligence, make any disclosures, or file any reports under the
rule.144
Second Step: If a company determines that it is subject to the
rule as required in the first step, then it must conduct a
reasonable country-of-origin inquiry.14 5 This inquiry must be
reasonably designed to determine if the conflict minerals
originated in the DRC or its neighboring countries, and it must
be done in good faith.14 6 The results of this inquiry can be any of
the following: (a) a determination that the conflict minerals did
not originate in the covered countries, (b) a determination that
the conflict minerals are from recycled or scrap sources, (c) an
inability to determine the origin of the conflict minerals, or (d) a
determination that the conflict minerals did originate in the
covered countries.147 A company that determines either of the
first two is required to disclose that fact in a new, specialized
disclosure, Form SD, and to describe the process it utilized in its
reasonable country-of-origin inquiry.148 Such companies need not
proceed to the third step. If a company is unable to determine
the origin of the conflict minerals, it too must file a specialized
disclosure stating its conclusion and describing its inquiry, but it
need not proceed to the third step unless it has reason to believe

142.
As an initial matter, only companies that are publicly traded via a listing
on a U.S. stock exchange are subject to the rule, as only they are governed by the
periodic reporting requirements of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934. See 17
C.F.R. § 200.1 (2006) (providing reporting requirements of the 1934 Act). The final SEC
rule makes this clear, stating: "[Tihe final rule applies to any issuer that files reports
with the [SEC] under Section 13(a) or Section 15(d) of the Exchange Act." Conflict
Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,287. Therefore, privately held corporations and, obviously,
corporations not listed and traded in the United States are not subject to the conflict
minerals legislation or the SEC's rule. However, the SEC decided, despite objections to
the contrary, that foreign private issuers who are listed on U.S. securities markets are
covered by the rule and must, therefore, file appropriate reports and engage in due
diligence when the rule requires. Id. at 56,287-88.
143.
Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. at 56,290.
144.
Id. at 56,279.
145.
Id. at 56,280.
146.
Id. at 56,310-14.
147.
Id.
148.
Id. at 56,280.
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its conflict minerals may have originated in a covered country
and may not be from recycled or scrap sources.14 9
Third Step: Companies whose reasonable country-of-origin
inquiry has led to the determination that the conflict minerals
originated or may have originated in the covered countries and
did not come from recycled or scrap materials must exercise due
diligence on the source and chain of custody of the conflict
minerals. They must file an extensive report about their due
diligence measures along with SEC Form SD.15 0 Ultimately, if
the due diligence process reveals that a company's conflict
minerals financed or benefited armed groups in the covered
countries, the company must disclose as much, 1s1 presumably
subjecting it to significant social and market pressure to avoid
such complicity in the future.
The due diligence process must comport with a nationally or
internationally recognized framework.15 2 Furthermore, the rule
requires an independent, external private audit of the report.1 53
The objective of the audit is to express an opinion or conclusion
as to whether the report describes due diligence measures that
comply with an appropriate due diligence framework and
whether it accurately describes the due diligence process the
company actually undertook.154

149.
If such a company proceeds to the due diligence process in the third step
and, through that process, determines that the origin of the conflict minerals was not a
covered country or that the conflict minerals came from recycled or scrap material, it
does not have to complete the third step. Id. Rather, it can simply complete the
specialized disclosure and briefly describe its reasonable country-of-origin inquiry and
the due diligence efforts that led to its conclusion that the conflict minerals were not
from the covered countries. Id.
150.
Id. at 56,316-29.
151.
Id. at 56,316-24.
152.
Id. at 56,326.
153.
Id. at 56,328-29.
154.
Id. at 56,329. The rule provides a two-year transition period (four years for
smaller companies), during which companies may certify their conflict minerals "DRC
conflict undeterminable" in either of two circumstances. First, a company may do so if
it is unable to determine whether its conflict minerals that originated in the covered
countries financed or benefited armed rebel groups. Alternatively, a company may
certify its conflict minerals "DRC conflict undeterminable" if its reasonable country-oforigin inquiry gave it reason to believe the conflict minerals may have originated in the
covered countries and the due diligence failed to provide additional clarification as to
whether the conflict minerals financed or benefited armed rebel groups. Id. at 56,321.
A company whose reports conclude "DRC conflict undeterminable" during the
transition period need not have the report audited but must file the report along with a
description of steps the company will take or has taken to mitigate the risk that its
conflict minerals will benefit armed groups. Id.
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Government Information Gathering

In addition to the public company reporting requirements, the
second way that the Dodd-Frank Act addresses the conflict minerals
issue is that it instructs the State Department to develop a strategy
to address "the linkages between human rights abuses, armed
groups, mining of conflict minerals and commercial products"'5 5 and
to create a map detailing conflict minerals in the DRC. 156 In
particular, the map is intended to provide up-to-date and publicly
available information about what mines, routes, and facilities are
considered to be under the control of armed groups. 15 7 Complying
with this requirement, however, has proven difficult for the State
Department. The most recent iteration of the map is based on
information in reports dated June and November 2012 from the UN
Group of Experts on the DRC.158 As noted on the map, the State
Department continues to be hampered in its efforts to produce a
comprehensive representation of the conflict-affected mines, routes,
and facilities because verifiable data regarding conditions in the DRC
is difficult to obtain. 159 The State Department indicates that locations
of mine sites, whether sites are active or inactive, and the activities of
armed groups in relation to those mines are all difficult to confirm
with current data sources. 160 As a result, the State Department
warns that the "map should not by itself be considered a source of
sufficient information to serve as a substitute for the exercise of
effective due diligence on companies' supply chains."s1 6
Third, § 1502 requires the U.S. comptroller general and the
secretary of commerce to provide baseline and ongoing reporting of
commercial activities in conflict minerals, notably including the
commercial activities of companies not required to file reports with
the SEC.1 62 This additional information will fill information gaps
created as a result of the reporting requirements only applying to
publicly traded companies.

Dodd-Frank Act §1502(c)(1)(A), Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 2213 (2010).
155.
156.
Id. § 1502(c)(2)(A).
157.
Id.
158.
Humanitarian Information Unit, DemocraticRepublic of the Congo Mineral
Exploitation By Armed Groups & Other Entities, U.S. DEP'T OF STATE (June 7, 2013),
available at https://hiu.state.gov/Products/DRCConflictMinerals_2013JunO7_HIU
U828.pdf.
159.
Id.
160.
Id.
161.
Id.
Dodd-Frank Act § 1502(d); see also Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. at
162.
56,288 n.110 (discussing the interplay between the SEC's final rule regarding conflict
minerals and the Comptroller General's reports).
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iii. Relation to PRR Framework
The U.S. conflict minerals legislation reflects a number of the
challenges and goals identified in the PRR Framework and Guiding
Principles. As Professor Taylor notes, § 1502 is an early indication
that these goals are taking root. 163 The legislation's incorporation of
the know and show style of due diligence, auditing, and reporting
clearly comports with SRSG Ruggie's vision of a human rights due
diligence norm. 164 Section 1502 is likely evidence that human rights
due diligence has entered the "norm cascade" phase of the norm life
cycle in international relations. 165 Moreover, Congress and the SEC
are clearly limited in what they can do to extend regulatory efforts
extraterritorially. 166 Yet, as Ruggie has argued, domestic measures
that force publicly traded companies to report on a variety of risks,
regardless of where the risks are incurred, can have extraterritorial
implications without charging headlong into the controversial realm
of directly regulating actors or actions that take place
extraterritorially. 167
In essence, § 1502 and the SEC's final rule force the
dissemination of information that is otherwise difficult or impossible
to discover. 168 Trade in conflict minerals is not prohibited or
sanctioned in any way. Rather, the filings and reports by covered

Taylor, supra note 127, at 23-25.
163.
Special Rep. of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights and
164.
Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Guiding Principles on
Business and Human Rights: Implementing the United Nations "Protect, Respect and
Remedy" Framework, Hum. Rts. Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) (by
John Ruggie).
See RUGGIE, supra note 6, at 128-29 (citing Martha Finnemore & Kathryn
165.
Sikink, InternationalNorm Dynamics and Political Change, 52 INT'L ORG. 887 (1998))
(describing the life-cycle of norm uptake). In contrast, the relative paucity of nationally
or internationally recognized due diligence frameworks that can be used by companies
to comply with the SEC rule and the resistance that business groups have exhibited to
the due diligence requirement are both evidence that the human rights due diligence
norm has not advanced to the internalization stage, where the norm takes on a "takenfor-granted quality." See id. (describing norm internalization). Indeed, the National
Association of Manufacturers, the Chamber of Commerce of the United States of
America, and the Business Roundtable recently filed an unsuccessful petition to
invalidate the SEC rule and find § 1502 unconstitutional. See Nat'l Ass'n of Mfrs. v.
SEC, Civil Action No. 13-cv-635 (RLW), 2013 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 102616, at *3 (D.D.C.
July 23, 2013) (granting summary judgment for the SEC and interveners).
Cf. Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1660-61 (2013)
166.
(holding that the presumption against extraterritorial application of U.S. law applies to
the Alien Tort Statute and that nothing in the text, history, or purpose of the statute
rebuts the presumption).
167.
See RUGGIE, supra note 6, at 109 ("The Commentary summarizes a
distinction ... between domestic policy measures that have extraterritorial effects, and
actually adjudicating conduct in one's own courts that took place within another
jurisdiction .... ).
168.
See Ochoa & Keenan, supra note 135, at 138-42 (discussing the
information-forcing nature of the legislation).
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companies, the secretary of state, the comptroller general, and the
secretary of commerce will distribute information about the use and
exploitation of conflict minerals up the supply chain and, ultimately,
to the consumer. The SEC rule recognizes that government entities
are not always in the best position to extract information on the
ground. As such, it anticipates that an independent yet
interconnected system of public and private regulative actors will
need to assist in that work, bringing to bear their greater technical
capacities and expertise. In other words, it relies on the development
of a polycentric system, of which § 1502 and its implementing
regulation are only part. The other components of this network are
discussed in the following subparts.
2.

Subnational-Level
Enactments

State

Actors:

State

and

Municipal

Since the enactment of § 1502, two states and several cities have
enacted complementary legislation aimed at reducing their exposure
to the human rights risks associated with conflict minerals.
Maryland's State Procurement and Congo Conflict Minerals Bill
prohibits state government units from knowingly procuring supplies
or services from any company that has failed to comply with
§ 1502. 169 Likewise, California's legislation, an amendment to a
public contracting act focusing on the genocide in Darfur, makes
companies that are noncompliant with § 1502 ineligible to bid on
contracts with a state agency to provide goods or services. 170
The Massachusetts House of Representatives is currently
considering a similar procurement bill, which would prohibit any
"scrutinized company" from bidding or submitting a proposal for a
contract for goods or services with a state agency.171 Scrutinized
company is defined as follows:
[A company] that is required to disclose information relating to conflict
minerals originating in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, or its
adjoining

countries,

pursuant

to

[Section

1502] . .. ,

where

the

[company] has filed an 'unreliable determination,'. . . reported false
information in their report . . . , or failed to file a report . .. and which

the [SEC] has, upon the completion of the commission's processes,
determined that [the company] has made a report that does not satisfy
the requirements of due diligence described in [Section 15021.172

Some cities, such as Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania; St. Petersburg,
Florida; and Edina, Minnesota, have passed resolutions calling on

169.
MD. CODE ANN., STATE FIN. & PROC., § 14-413 (LexisNexis 2013).
170.
CAL. PUB. CONT. CODE § 10490 (Deering 2013).
An Act Relative to Congo Conflict Minerals, MASS. H.B. No. 2989, 188th
171.
Gen. Court (2013), available at https://malegislature.gov/Bills/188/House/H2898
[http://perma.ccl9Z6-XCYX] (archived on Jan. 27, 2014).
172.
Id. § 2(a).
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companies in their cities to engage in due diligence and to take any
necessary remedial steps to remove from their supply chains any
conflict minerals that fund armed groups. 173 Pittsburgh's
proclamation also supported the development of international
certification systems to ensure minerals from Central Africa are not
contributing to conflict, 174 providing another example of the
burgeoning polycentric regime regulating firms that potentially trade
in conflict minerals.
These enactments and proclamations reinforce the norms related
to due diligence and reporting on conflict minerals. They address one
of the priorities that SRSG Ruggie enumerated in his 2010 report to
the UN Human Rights Council to help bridge the coherence-based
governance gaps-namely, that governments should consider human
rights when they do business with business. 175
3.

National-Level State Actors: Other National Laws

Other countries have indicated some willingness to follow the
lead of the United States with regard to domestic legislation like
§ 1502, highlighting the United States' status as a potential norm
entrepreneur. For instance, in March 2013, Canadian member of
Parliament (MP) Paul Dewar introduced a bill that would impose due
diligence and reporting requirements similar to § 1502.176 Bill C-486,
MP Dewar's bill, would require Canadian corporations that have
"processed, purchased, traded in, used or extracted a designated
[conflict] mineral, or contracted to do so" to "exercise due diligence in
respect of any extraction, processing, purchasing, trading in or use of
designated [conflict] minerals that it carries out in the course of its

173.
See Appendix D-Legislative and Other Initiatives, HEADS UP (Deloitte,
New York, N.Y.), Sept. 11, 2012, at 11 (compiling legislation).
174.
See File # 2011-1639, CITY OF PITTSBURGH (Apr. 19, 2011),
https://pittsburgh.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=873982&GUID=53DB676C7643-4948-A56D-6731D4925634 [http://perma.cc/TW4T-2YK6] (archived Jan. 27, 2014)
("BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that the Council of the City of Pittsburgh calls on US
executive leadership in helping to establish an international certification system for
minerals coming from Central Africa to ensure they are not contributing to conflict.").
175.
See Special Rep. of the Secretary-General on the Issue of Human Rights
and Transnational Corporations and Other Business Enterprises, Business and
Human Rights: Further Steps Toward the Operationalizationof the "Protect, Respect
and Remedy" Framework, 1 26-32, Hum. Rts. Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/14/27 (Apr.
9, 2010) (by John Ruggie) ("[T]he State's role as an economic actor is a key-but
underutilized-leverage point in promoting corporate human rights awareness and
preventing abuse."); see also supra text accompanying note 97 (discussing Ruggie's
conception of governance gaps).
An Act Respecting Corporate Practices Relating to the Extraction,
176.
Processing,Purchase, Trade and Use of Conflict Minerals from the Great Lakes Region
of Africa, Bill C-486, First Reading, Mar. 26, 2013 (41st Parliament, 1st Sess.),
available at http://www.parl.gc.ca/HousePublications/Publication.aspx?Language=E&
Mode=1&DocId=6062040&File=4&Col=1 [http://perma.cclKZ5C-B7NS] (archived Jan.
27, 2014).
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activities, or that it contracts to have carried out."1 77 Such companies
would be required to submit reports to the minister of foreign affairs
and publish the reports on their websites. The reports would include
a description of the due diligence process used by the companies and
would be required to be independently audited by a third party. 7 8
Similarly, in March 2013, the European Commission
Directorate-General for Trade commenced a public consultation to
explore the possibility of an EU initiative similar to § 1502.179 A
public questionnaire was opened to solicit views on an initiative for
responsible sourcing of conflict minerals.1 80 The questionnaire sought
feedback on whether a due diligence and reporting framework should
be adopted.18 1 In addition, the questionnaire asked whether an EU
conflict minerals initiative should operate in the same manner as the
EU Timber Regulation. 182 The consultation was completed in June
2013, and the contributions will be published online.18 3 The results of
the questionnaire are likely to be used to determine whether to
support ongoing due diligence initiatives related to conflict minerals
and how to reasonably and effectively do so if such support is
warranted.184
4.

Intergovernmental Actors: OECD Guidance

The SEC rule implementing § 1502 requires that companies use
a nationally or internationally recognized due diligence framework to
conduct their conflict mineral due diligence. 8 5 The rule specifies that,
at the time of its adoption, the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) had issued the only known
internationally recognized framework that would allow companies to

177.
Id. §§ 3-4.
Id. § 4.
178.
179.
Kirsten Wallerstedt, EU and Canada Consider Conflict Minerals Rules, 3E
COMPANY (Apr. 4, 2013), http://3ecompany.comlblog/?p=172 [http://perma.cc/TDG73QVL] (archived Jan. 27, 2014).
180.
Id.
181.
Id.
182.
Id. The EU Timber Regulation prohibits illegally harvested timber or
products produced from such timber from being placed on the EU market. Timber
Regulation, EUROPEAN COMM'N,
http://ec.europa.eulenvironment/forests/timber_
regulation.htm [http://perma.cc/9CV7-59FF] (archived Jan. 27, 2014) (last updated Jan.
14, 2014). It also requires firms who place timber on the EU market to "exercise due
diligence" and to "keep records of their suppliers and customers." Id.
183.
See Public Consultation on a Possible EU Initiative on Responsible
Sourcing of Minerals Originating from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas,
EUROPEAN
COMM'N,
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/consultationsl?consulid=174
[http://perma.cc/RT3J-GG7E] (archived Jan. 27, 2014) (last updated Feb. 14, 2014)
(providing information and links related to the consultation).
184.
Wallerstedt, supra note 179.
185.
Conflict Minerals, 77 Fed. Reg. 56,274, 56,326 (Sept. 12, 2012) (to be
codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240).
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comply with the rule. 86 Thus, this subpart will describe the OECD
and its due diligence framework.
The OECD is an intergovernmental economic organization
consisting of thirty-four of the most developed nations in the world,
all of which are committed to democratic government and the market
economy.' 8 7 Another twenty-five nonmember countries participate as
regular observers or full participants in OECD committees,18 8 and
fifty nonmembers participate in other OECD activities but are less
extensively engaged.' 8 9 The OECD's mission is to "promote policies
that will improve the economic and social well-being of people around
the world,"19 0 and it is "a forum in which governments can work
together to share experiences and seek solutions to common
problems."191 To achieve these goals, the OECD focuses mostly on the
generation of knowledge and best practices.' 9 2 Its consensus-based
programs are typically nonbinding but are meant to be dispersed and
adopted to the extent that member and nonmember states have the
political will to do so.' 9 3 Because of the collective and individual
influence and global market power of the Member States, OECD
programs and standards tend to be adopted broadly and exert
significant influence.194
Relevant to this discussion, the OECD has long provided
leadership by example in the promulgation of corporate governance
initiatives. For instance, the OECD Principles of Corporate

186.
See id. ("The OEDC's "Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible Supply
Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk Areas" satisfies our criteria
and may be used as a framework for purposes of satisfying the final rule's requirement
that an issuer exercise due diligence in determining the source and chain of custody of
its conflict minerals.").
187.

See About the OECD, ORGANISATION FOR EcON. CO-OPERATION & DEV.,

http://www.oecd.orglabout/ [http://perma.cclRPQ8-77UV] (archived Jan. 20, 2014) ("The
common thread of our work is a shared commitment to market economies backed by
democratic institutions . . . .").
188.
See Members and Partners, ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION &
DEV., http://www.oecd.org/about/membersandpartners/ [http://perma.cc/PJ2M-B2ZN]
(archived Jan. 20, 2014) ("Over time, OECD's focus has broadened to include extensive
contacts with non-member economies and it now maintains co-operative relations with
more than 70 of them.").
189.
Id.
190.
About the OECD, supra note 187.
191.
Id.
192.
See Larry Cati Backer, Part 1; The U.S. National Contact Point-Corporate
Social Responsibility Between Nationalism, Internationalism and Private Markets
Based Globalization, LAW AT THE END OF THE DAY (Feb. 2, 2013, 10:24 PM),
http://lcbackerblog.blogspot.com/2013/02/part-1-us-national-contact-point.html
[http://perma.cc/X3RE-RB65] (archived Jan. 20, 2014) ("As thus constituted, the OECD
tends to focus on knowledge production and consensus based programs that are meant
to be adopted. . .
193.
Id.
194.
See id. ("[B]ecause it is made up of the most developed states on the planet,
programs and standards adopted through the OECD tend to be quite influential, and
are likely to trickle down to both other states and private regulatory bodies").
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Governance provide a framework for effective corporate governance,
including a chapter devoted to disclosure and transparency. 195
Growing out of this commitment to corporate governance and
recognizing the need to provide guidance regarding conflict mineral
due diligence in light of the increased attention to the abuses in the
DRC, the OECD adopted the Due Diligence Guidance for Responsible
Supply Chains of Minerals from Conflict-Affected and High-Risk
Areas (Due Diligence Guidance) in May 2011.196 Subsequently, in
2012, the Supplement on Gold was developed as a complement to the
Due Diligence Guidance, and the Due Diligence Guidance was
updated to include references to the Supplement on Gold.197
The Due Diligence Guidance was developed in concert with
representatives from eleven countries of the International Conference
on the Great Lakes Region (ICGLR), which include Angola, Burundi,
the Central African Republic, the Republic of Congo, the DRC, Kenya,
Rwanda, Sudan, Tanzania, Uganda, and Zambia. 198 In addition,
representatives from industry, civil society, and the UN Group of
Experts on the DRC consulted in its development. 199 The Due
Diligence Guidance has received broad-based support from the
ICGLR countries, the OECD itself (at both committee and ministerial
levels), and UN organizations, including the Security Council. 20 0 As
with most OECD guidance, the Due Diligence Guidance is not legally
binding, but it has received sufficient OECD endorsement to "reflect[]
the common position and political commitment of the OECD members
and non-member adherents." 2 0 1
The Due Diligence Guidance provides a detailed framework for
due diligence in responsible supply chain management regarding
conflict minerals. Due diligence is defined in the guidance as "an ongoing, proactive and reactive process through which companies can
ensure that they respect human rights and do not contribute to
conflict." 202 Although a full description of the Due Diligence Guidance

See ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], PRINCIPLES
195.
OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE 22-23 (2004), available at http://www.oecd.org/
[http://perma.cc/4ZGH-XL9Q]
daf/calcorporategovernanceprinciples/31557724.pdf
(archived Jan. 20, 2014) (providing guidelines for disclosure and transparency in the
corporate government framework).
See ORGANISATION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV. [OECD], OECD DUE
196.
DILIGENCE GUIDANCE FOR RESPONSIBLE SUPPLY CHAINS OF MINERALS FROM CONFLICTavailable at
ed.
2013),
3
(2d
AREAS
HIGH-RISK
AND
AFFECTED
[http://perma.cc[KFJ2-EBHP]
http://www.oecd.org/daflinv/mne/GuidanceEdition2.pdf
(archived Jan. 20, 2014) (describing reasons behind the creation of the guidance
document).
See id. at 4 (providing an overview of the amendment process that led to
197.
the incorporation of reference to the Supplement on Gold).
Id. at 3.
198.
Id.
199.
See id. (describing sources of support for the initiative).
200.
Id. at 4.
201.
Id. at 13.
202.
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is beyond the scope of this Article, it is worth noting that it provides a
five-step framework for risk-based due diligence. According to the
framework, performing due diligence requires (1) establishing strong
company management systems; (2) identifying and assessing risk in
the supply chain; (3) defining and implementing a strategy to respond
to identified risks; (4) carrying out independent third-party audits of
supply chain due diligence at identified points in the supply chain;
and (5) reporting on supply chain due diligence. 203 In essence, the
Due Diligence Guidance provides the expert guidance for the
development and implementation of the due diligence requirements
in § 1502 and other regulatory efforts aimed at conflict mineral
supply chain management.
Acting independently, but with knowledge of the governance
efforts of other actors, particularly Congress, to regulate information
regarding the use of conflict minerals, the OECD has contributed its
broad-based consultation and expertise to provide nonlegally binding
regulation to the polycentric governance system for conflict minerals.
Because the conflict minerals issue represents a challenge to
responsible corporate participation in the global economy, the
matching principle 204 would suggest that an intergovernmental
economic organization ought to be involved in addressing the
problems associated with it. However, as discussed in Part V, it is
possible that the SEC's adoption of the Due Diligence Guidance as the
only compliant due diligence framework under § 1502 will actually
stifle the effective functioning of the polycentric governance system
by crowding out smaller-scale local, regional, or national due
diligence systems that might have been more appropriately tailored
to the needs of regulated actors at that scale. 205
5.

Global, Industry-Level Nonstate Actors: GeSI/EICC ConflictFree Smelter Program and IPC Due Diligence Guidance

In addition to state and intergovernmental soft-law actors,
purely private industry organizations have been intensely involved in
the process of regulating the conflict mineral supply chain. Here, this
Article highlights just two examples of organizations that represent
collective concerns of private commercial interests.

203.
See id. at 17-19 (providing detailed descriptions of appropriate actions
within each of these steps).
204.
See supra note 82 and accompanying text for a discussion of the matching
principle.
205.
For a discussion of the risk of "crowding out," see supra note 72 and
accompanying text.
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Conflict-Free Smelter Program

Among the more daunting challenges to implementing any
transparency and traceability regime for conflict minerals is the
unique nature of the supply chain. To grossly oversimplify a complex
process, 206 unrefined minerals come from a huge number of different
mines and intermediate sources to a significantly smaller number of
smelting companies to be refined into the minerals that are
ultimately used in products like electronics.20 7 Thus, the smelters
represent a choke point in the supply chain. 208 As such, they can play
a vital role in helping with the traceability challenges that are
inherent in an inquiry of origin process or in performing due
diligence. If companies can trace their conflict minerals to specific
smelters and those smelters can credibly certify that their inventories
of conflict minerals did not finance or benefit armed rebel groups,
tracing the minerals back to their countries of origin and completing
the due diligence process becomes substantially less complicated.
Smelters can do so by knowing from where and from whom they
source their unrefined stock, keeping track of their inputs, and
matching that to their outputs. 209
Yet, tracking the source of conflict minerals is still daunting for
any one company to tackle on its own. For instance, after mapping
over 90 percent of its supply line for microprocessors between 2009
and 2012, Intel found that it had approximately two hundred
suppliers, more than six thousand line items involved, and
approximately 140 unique smelters who were engaged in that supply
chain. 2 10
Industry groups have stepped into this gap by assisting
companies and coordinating cooperative behavior to encourage

206.
See INTEL, ELECTRONIC INDUS. CITIZENSHIP COALITION (EICC], ASSESSING
(2011),
available at
at 1
THE SUPPLY CHAIN FOR CONFLICT MINERALS

[http://perma.cc/GMLdocuments/IntelCSFinal_09_2011.pdf
http://www.eicc.info/
43ZU] (archived Jan. 20, 2014) ("The electronics industry supply chain is deep and
wide, with many layers of suppliers and multiple countries. As a result, it is difficult
for many companies to verify the origin of all the metals used in manufacturing
products-some of which enter the supply chain dozens of levels away from many
different sources .... ).
207.
See PRENDERGAST & LEZCHNEV, supra note 112, at 1 (outlining the basic
conflict mineral supply chain).
See, e.g., ENOUGH PROJECT, GETTING TO CONFLICT FREE 3 (2010), available
208.
[http://perma.cc/ZJQ2at http://www.enoughproject.org/files/corporateaction-1.pdf
7QBV] (archived Jan. 20, 2014) ("The smelters represent the crucial chokepoint in the
supply chain, where minerals are processed into metals, and are therefore key to
ethical sourcing.").
See Carolyn Duran, Intel and Conflict Minerals: A Journey of Learning,
209.
Challenges and Leadership: Progress in Driving Conflict Free Sourcing (2012)
(unpublished PowerPoint slides) (on file with author) (describing Intel's experience
working with smelters in its supply chain).
Id.
210.
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smelters to credibly assert their conflict-free status. 211 Moreover, the
groups coordinate cooperative action among mineral buyers and endusers, which helps to lessen the collective action problem that would
otherwise arise when noncompliant companies source from smelters
who do not want to expend the money or effort to become certified as
conflict-free. 212 Without a critical mass of demand and pressure from
up the supply chain, an insufficient number of smelters would have
the incentive to cooperate. 213
In the wake of the move toward conflict mineral regulatory
initiatives, the Electronic Industry Citizenship Coalition (EICC) and
the Global e-Sustainability Initiative (GeSI) joined forces to create
the Conflict-Free Sourcing Initiative (CFSI). 214 The EICC is a
coalition of leading electronics companies that coordinates global
supply chain initiatives to improve efficiency and social, ethical, and
environmental outcomes. 2 15 The GeSI is a coalition of information
and communication technology companies that focuses on
sustainability issues. 216 Together, the EICC and GeSI spearheaded a
working group-along with stakeholders in the Automotive Industry
Action Group, the Japanese Electronics and Information Technology
Industries, and the Retail Industry Leaders Association, among
others-reminiscent of the small clubs of like-minded stakeholders
discussed above. 217 This interindustry working group launched the

211.
See generally ELECTRONIC INDUS. CITIZENSHIP COALITION, GLOBAL ESUSTAINABILITY INITIATIVE, EICC-GESI CONFLICT-FREE SMELTER (CFS) ASSESSMENT
PROGRAM: FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (Mar. 30, 2012) [hereinafter FREQUENTLY

ASKED QUESTIONS], available at http://share.pdfonline.com/f9e64b7del3342ea9f8
7e279448055bl/Conflict-FreeSmelterFAQ.pdf [http://perma.cc/8Y2J-HFC4] (archived
Jan. 20, 2014) (providing detailed information on the Conflict-Free Smelter (CFS)
assessment program).
212.
See Duran, supra note 209 (discussing the resistance of smelters to
undertake the cost of certification and developing monetary incentives to encourage
them to do so).
213.
Id.
214.
See Conflict-Free Smelters & Refiners, ELECTRONIC INDUS. CITIZENSHIP
available
at
INITIATIVE,
COALITION,
GLOBAL
E-SUSTAINABILITY
[http://perma.cc/
http://www.conflictfreesourcing.org/conflict-free-smelter-refiner-lists/
EX8N-PHMH] (archived Jan. 20, 2014) (last visited Feb. 16, 2014) (providing the
names and locations of smelters and refiners compliant with the program).
215.

See About Us, ELECTRONIC INDUS. CITIZENSHIP COALITION (Aug. 4, 2011),

http://www.eicc.info/aboutLus.shtml [http://perma.cc/H3Z-QSD4] (archived Jan. 20,
2014) (providing an overview of the organization as a whole and its purpose).
216.
See About GeSI Overview, GLOBAL E-SUSTAINABILITY
INITIATIVE,
http://gesi.org/About_-ICT sustainability [http://perma.cc/AE4H-4XRM] (archived Jan.
20, 2014) (last visited Feb. 16, 2014) (providing basic information and purpose of the
organization).
217.
See Press Release, Electronic Indus. Citizenship Coalition, Global eSustainability Initiative, EICC and GeSI Launch Conflict-Free Sourcing Initiative
(Apr. 30, 2013), available at http://eicc.info/documents/PRCFSILaunchFINAL.pdf
[http://perma.ccl4PBJ-VAXU] (archived Jan. 20, 2014) (announcing the launch of the
Initiative); see also supra note 30 and accompanying text (describing the formation of
"clubs" to address larger-scale problems).

490

VANDERBILTJOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL

LAW

[VOL. 47-451

CFSI in April 2013. Today, the CFSI incorporates a Conflict-Free
Smelter Program (CFS Program), a Conflict Minerals Reporting
Template, 218 conflict-free minerals supply chain workshops, conflict
minerals training and best practices dissemination, and research on
conflict minerals and metals used in the electronics sector.2 19 By the
end November 2013, the growing list of conflict-free tantalum
smelters numbered twenty-three. 220
Thirty gold refiners were certified by the CFS Program as of midDecember 2013.221 While by the end of 2013 no tungsten smelters had
yet achieved compliance, 222 eight tin smelters had gained certification
by mid-December 2013. 223 Compliant smelters and refiners have
taken steps to document their sourcing and sales to ensure conflictfree status of their inventories. They also submit to rigorous thirdparty auditing to ensure their compliance.2 2 4
Becoming conflict-free certified is not a cheap process. Individual
members of the EICC and GeSI developed an "Early-Adopters Fund"
to incentivize smelters to undergo the certification and audit
process. 2 25 Intel, HP, and the GE Foundation donated $225,000 to the
program, which was managed by the EICC and RESOLVE, 226 a wellrespected NGO that is active in working to solve diverse natural

218.
See Conflict Minerals Reporting Template, CONFLICT-FREE SOURCING
INITIATIVE,
http://www.conflictfreesourcing.org/conflict-minerals-reporting-template/
[http://perma.cc/F64X-VQH7] (archived Jan. 20, 2014) (providing links to the template
form, instructional documents and videos, and dashboard tools for use with the
template).
219.
See Press Release, supra note 217, at 1 (describing programs associated
with the CFSI).
220.
See Conflict-Free Tantalum Smelters, CONFLICT-FREE SOURCING INITIATIVE,
http://www.conflictfreesourcing.org/tantalum-conflict-free-smelters/
[http://perma.cc/
5M8T-R5GT] (archived Jan. 20, 2014) (last updated Feb. 11, 2014) (providing
comprehensive list of conflict-free tantalum smelters).
221.
Conflict-Free Gold Refiners, CONFLICT-FREE SOURCING INITIATIVE,
http://www.conflictfreesourcing.org/gold-conflict-free-smelters/
[http://perma.cc/4VZM5975?type=pdf| (archived Jan. 20, 2014) (last updated Feb. 14, 2014).
222.
Conflict-Free Smelter Program Compliant Tungsten Smelter List,
CONFLICT-FREE SOURCING INITIATIVE, http://www.conflictfreesourcing.org/tungstenconflict-free-smelters/ [http://perma.cc/3TU6-4UVK] (archived Jan. 20, 2014) (last
updated Jan. 9, 2014).
223.
Conflict-Free Tin Smelters, CONFLICT-FREE SOURCING INITIATIVE,
http://www.conflictfreesourcing.org/tin-conflict-free-smelters/
[http://perma.cc/VZN5P8GF] (archived Jan. 20, 2014) (last updated Jan. 28, 2014).
224.
See FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS, supra note 211, at 9-10 (explaining
the auditing process required for compliance).
225.
See generally Press Release, RESOLVE, Intel, HP, GE Foundation Create
Fund to Encourage Participation in Conflict-Free Smelter Program (Apr. 3, 2012),
available at http://www.resolv.org/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/CFS-Early-Adopters[http://perma.cclKYR7-FJXN?type=pdfJ
Fund-Launch-Press-Release-FINAL.pdf
(archived Jan. 20, 2014) (discussing the launch of RESOLVE's funding program).
226.
Id.; Duran, supra note 209.
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resource, environmental, and public health problems. 22 7 The EarlyAdopters Fund promised reimbursement for half the audit costs, or
about $5,000, to smelters or refiners that passed their conflict-free
audit. 22 8 This cooperative problem solving is a hallmark of polycentric
governance.
ii.

IPC Due Diligence Guidance

Industry-specific trade organizations have supplemented the
foregoing efforts of other actors. They provide education and guidance
to their members to assist with the uptake of the due diligence norm.
For example, IPC-Association Connecting Electronics Industries has
promulgated its Conflict Minerals Due Diligence Guidance. 229 IPC is
a global trade organization focused on the electronic interconnection
industry. 230 Though its guidance does little of substance beyond
synthesizing the requirements of § 1502 and the guidance provided by
the OECD Due Diligence Guidelines, it provides additional education,
exposure, and operational capacity to incorporate the investigation,
due diligence, and reporting requirements.
6.

Civil-Society-Level Nonstate Actors: On-the-Ground Initiatives
in the DRC and the Enough Project's Conflict-Free Campus
Initiative

Any truly polycentric system will have local decision-making
centers involved in the process. This is one area where the RPP
Framework is arguably ill-fitted to the polycentric governance model.
SRSG Ruggie has been criticized for failing to adequately and
explicitly include civil society and multistakeholder initiatives in the
RPP Framework. 231 He has indicated that their participation is

227.
See About, RESOLVE, http://www.resolv.org/about [http://perma.cc/E3A2BVBB] (archived Jan. 20, 2014) (last visited Feb. 16, 2013) (discussing the history and
mission of RESOLVE).
228.
Press Release, supranote 217, at 1.
229.
See New IPC Guide Spells out Electronics Manufacturers' Conflict Minerals
Due Diligence Obligations,IPC-AsS'N CONNECTING ELECTRONICS INDUS. (Feb. 12, 2013),
http://www.ipc.org/ContentPage.aspx?pageid=New-IPC-Guide-Spells-Out-ElectronicsManufacturers-Conflict-Minerals-Due-Diligence-Obligations
[http://perma.cc/3FHCNW3A] (archived Jan. 20, 2014) (describing the IPC Conflict Minerals Due Diligence
Guide and explaining its purpose).
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http://www.ipc.org/ContentPage.aspx?pageid=Mission-Statement
[http://perma.cclF44R-ZCNA] (archived Jan. 20, 2014) (describing IPC as a "global
trade association" designed to assist members of "the electronic interconnection
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See Tara J. Melish & Errol Meidinger, Protect, Respect, Remedy and
Participate:"New Governance" Lessons for the Ruggie Framework, in THE UN GUIDING
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303, 303-05 (Radu Mares ed.,

2011) (arguing that there should be a fourth
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incorporated and assumed in both the second and third pillars of the
framework. 232 Perhaps belying that criticism, civil society actors and
NGOs have had significant influence on the development of § 1502,
the complementary state and local legislation, and other initiatives.
The Enough Project, for instance, was instrumental in mobilizing
grassroots support and providing testimony and anecdotal evidence to
support the need for the state-based initiatives. 233 In addition,
Enough Project affiliates have spearheaded small-scale and local
initiatives to raise awareness about the sourcing of conflict minerals.
In particular, the Enough Project's conflict-free campus programs
took root at a large number of college and high school campuses,
including fifteen campuses where official resolutions encouraging
conflict-free sourcing have been passed. 234 At the least, these
initiatives serve an educational purpose; moreover, they also likely
co-opt these educational institutions-themselves influential civil
society organizations and market actors-to the polycentric
governance project and provide additional opportunities for creative
thinking, market pressure, and norm diffusion.
On the other hand, stakeholders on the ground in the DRC have
seemingly had less involvement in the conflict minerals regulatory
process than one might expect. Some local NGOs have been
instrumental in studying chain-of-custody and cross-border
transactional issues in the conflict minerals space.235 As the regime
has developed, it has presented a potential threat, at least in the
short term, even to the meager sustenance local populations receive
from mining operations, both legitimate and illicit. Indeed, a group of
local miner cooperatives expressed in their comments on the proposed
conflict mineral rules to the SEC a concern about the effects that

"Participate" pillar to the RPP framework to account for the need to have formal
involvement of civil society actors).
232.
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233.
See, e.g., Enough Project Applauds Maryland Conflict Minerals Law,
ENOUGH (May 2, 2012), http://www.enoughproject.org/news/enough-project-applaudsmaryland-conflict-mineral-law [http://perma.cclEQ6D-BYM6] (archived Jan. 20, 2014)
(noting Enough Project's involvement in getting the Maryland law enacted).
234.
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FOR
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http://www.raisehopeforcongo.org/content/participating-schools
[http://perma.cc/JC5ZUUYF] (archived Jan. 18, 2014) (last visited Feb. 16, 2014) (listing the schools that
have passed resolutions).
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See, e.g., ALOYS TEGERA & DOMINIC JOHNSON, POLE INSTITUTE, RULES FOR
SALE: FORMAL AND INFORMAL CROSS-BORDER TRADE IN EASTERN DRC (2007), available
at
http://s3.amazonaws.com/zanran.storage/www.dfid.gov.uk/ContentPages/5045613.pdf
[http://perma.cc/74N9-BS2G] (archived Jan. 18, 2014) (reporting a study of cross-border
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Economic Sector in Eastern DRC), POLE INST. (Mar. 2010), http://poleinstitute.org/index.php/archive/148-blood-minerals-the-criminalization-of-an-economicsector-in-eastern-drc [http://perma.cc/9JV2-49J9] (archived Jan. 18, 2014) (providing
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issue).
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§ 1502 will have on the ground. 236 Concerns have been raised that the
process will do little to alleviate the conflict and the concomitant
violence and abuse suffered by local populations. 237
There have been initiatives on the ground in the DRC and
neighboring countries to assist traceability efforts in the mine-tosmelter stage of the supply chain. These include the "iTSCi Bag and
Tag" initiative, which is focused on tin mines; 238 Solutions for Hope,
which deals with tantalum mining; 239 and the Public-Private Alliance
for Responsible Mineral Sourcing, which provides funding and
support for building capacity in the DRC for supply chain
transparency and chain-of-custody programs. 240 The extent of these
initiatives' incorporation of in-region communities and organizations
is, however, unclear, and, regardless, the instability on the ground in
the DRC has made these initiatives difficult to sustain. For example,
the iTSCi initiative, which focused on piloting tin traceability in
several mines in the eastern DRC, had to be abandoned when the
DRC government suspended mining operations in certain regions
between September 2010 and March 2011.241 Thus, instability at the
local level has prevented local organizations from being as active at
the local level in the polycentric governance regime as one might
expect or hope.

IV. SUMMARIZING THE POTENTIAL OF POLYCENTRIC
GOVERNANCE TO PROMOTE HUMAN RIGHTS
IN BUSINESS

There is no perfect forum in a multipolar world; both top-down
and bottom-up regulatory approaches have benefits and drawbacks.
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237.
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In the business and human rights context, focusing exclusively on
multilateral treaties such as the Norms discussed in Part II would
help manage free riders but would risk stalling progress, given
geopolitical and socioeconomic divides. However, relying on bottomup regulations such as the Conflict-Free Sourcing Initiative, or even
§ 1502, promises informality, flexibility, and promotes
experimentation even as the absence of hierarchical control threatens
gridlock. A true polycentric approach would be an all-of-the-above
effort that includes the best of both worlds, but determining how this
could work in practice first requires an analysis of the literature on
polycentric governance, particularly the LAD framework.
Professor Ostrom created an informative framework of eight
design principles for the management of common-pool resources that
helps to guide discussion. These principles include (1) "clearly defined
boundaries for the user pool .. . and the resource domain"; 242 (2)
"proportional equivalence between benefits and costs"; 243 (3)
"collective choice arrangements ensur[ing] that the resource users
participate

in

setting . .. rules";

244

(4)

"monitoring . . . by

the

appropriators or by their agents";24 5 (5) "graduated sanctions" for rule
violators; 246 (6) "conflict-resolution mechanisms [that] are readily
available, low cost, and legitimate"; 24 7 (7) "minimal recognition of
rights to organize"; 248 and (8) "governance activities [that] are
organized in multiple layers of nested enterprises." 249 Not all of
Professor Ostrom's design principles are applicable in the context of
business and human rights given that they were designed primarily
for managing small-scale, common-pool resources, such as forests and
lakes. However, some of the principles do have salience and are
addressed in turn.
A. Defined Boundaries
According to Professor Ostrom, "The boundary rules relate to
who can enter, harvest, manage, and potentially exclude others'
impacts. Participants then have more assurance
about
trustworthiness and cooperation of the others involved." 250 The
literature on boundary rules suggests that group-defined boundaries
can help foster trust and collaboration but narrowly focused

242.
BUCK, supra note 19, at 32.
243.
Ostrom, supra note 70, at 118 tbl.5.3 (citing ELINOR OSTROM, GOVERNING
THE COMMONS: THE EVOLUTION OF INSTITUTIONS FOR COLLECTIVE ACTION 90 (1990)).
244.
BUCK, supra note 19, at 32.
245.
Id.
246.
Id.
247.
Id.
248.
Ostrom, supra note 70, at 118 tbl.5.3.
249.
Id.
250.
Id. at 119.
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communities can also ignore other interests, stakeholders, and the
wider impact of their actions. 251 To overcome such apathy,
communities must have a defined stake in the outcome to effectuate
good governance, which can in part be accomplished by educating
managers about the importance of adhering to internationally
recognized human rights practices.
The conflict minerals regime is narrowly focused on a particular
issue of importance, in a particular region, and with a particular goal
in mind. However, it has attempted to include communities-for
example, the publicly listed manufacturers for which conflict
minerals are necessary to the manufacture of their products-that
may not have a clearly defined stake in managing conflict minerals
when they can adequately source their minerals from nonconflictaffected areas. Section 1502 may help create that stake, which has
resulted in community and trust building along the supply chain.
This movement may be further strengthened depending on the
outcome of the proposed regulations in Canada and the European
Union.25 2
B. Proportionality
This design principle underscores the need for equity in a system
so that some of the "users [do not] get all the benefits and pay few of
the costs." 253 Such a principle echoes in the business and human
rights space in the form of measures that seek to prevent human
rights violators from profiting from their practices by defining a level
playing field.
The conflict minerals regime has not attained perfect
proportionality. On one hand, the smelter Early-Adopter Fund is
designed to level the playing field among the smelters, such that the
costs that early adopters might otherwise have to shoulder to their
detriment are offset. 254 On the other hand, only covered entities
under the Dodd-Frank Act 25 5 are required to submit filings under
§ 1502. Moreover, as other countries and regions, like Canada and the
European Union, enter the conflict minerals regulation space, foreign
companies will be able to piggyback on the work that U.S.-listed
companies have done to comply with the Dodd-Frank Act without

E.g., MURRAY, supra note 7, at 164 ("Each of these narrow community
251.
interests simply ignore the other so long as they do not impact directly on their
activites.").
252.
See supra Part II.B.3.
253.
Ostrom, supra note 70, at 120.
254.
See supra text accompanying notes 225-28 (describing the early-adopter
program).
255.
See supra note 142 (noting that only public reporting companies under the
Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 are required to submit reports pursuant to
Section 1502).
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having to invest in the creation of the tracing and reporting
infrastructure.
C. Collective Choice Arrangements and Minimal
Recognition of Rights
Professor Ostrom's third design principle requires "that most of
the individuals affected by a resource regime [be] authorized to
participate in making and modifying the rules related to boundaries
[and the] assessment of costs." 256 This principle implies the
importance of rulemaking by engaging the private sector in a publicprivate dialogue before moving to codify best practices at various
regulatory levels. Moreover, this principle recognizes the need to
modify rules as the environment changes. 257 Indeed, the
tremendously variable legal environment of business and human
rights around the world, including in Africa, highlights the
importance of a dynamic, context-specific approach that takes into
account current conditions on the ground.
The lack of comprehensive and effective on-the-ground
involvement of NGOs in the DRC suggests that the conflict minerals
regime is challenged in this regard. However, NGOs were highly
involved in lobbying Congress to write and pass § 1502. 258
Consequently, there has been significant involvement by some
grassroots and civil society organizations in the crafting and design of
the conflict minerals regime. Moreover, the notice and comment
period for the SEC rulemaking process was extended and garnered
hundreds of comments. 259 Thus, it is clear that a significant
opportunity for involvement in the process of implementing § 1502
was available to interested parties of all types, 260 providing some
encouragement to proponents of applying polycentric governance to
promote human rights in business.
D. Monitoring
As Professor Ostrom posits, trust can typically only do so much
to mitigate rule-breaking behavior. 261 Eventually, some level of
monitoring becomes important. In self-organized communities,

256.
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257.
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monitors are typically chosen from among the members to ensure
"the conformance of others to local rules."262 The conflict minerals
regime has incorporated some, but not all, of the monitoring
principle. The monitoring principle manifests itself in the business
and human rights context in the form of the various initiatives that
implement SRSG Ruggie's know and show ethic. Likewise, the
conflict minerals regime is organized around that approach.
26 3
Moreover, the certification schemes under § 1502 described above
facilitate this sort of monitoring. Going forward, however, industry
groups should select certain enterprises engaged in norm
entrepreneurship to monitor peer behavior,264 such as supply chain
transparency, as a step toward undergirding the PRR Framework.

E. GraduatedSanctions and Dispute Resolution
Other insights from Professor Ostrom's principles, such as the
need for graduated sanctions for rule violators and effective dispute
resolution, speak to the importance of addressing legal ambiguities
and establishing norms of behavior in the business and human rights
context. The former point underscores the significance of not "[1]etting
an infraction pass unnoticed,"2 65 meaning that some combination of
market reaction and governmental action is needed to instill human
rights best practices in a business setting. As described in Part III.A
above, § 1502 relies almost entirely on market pressure to affect the
conflict minerals regime. The proper combination of market pressure
and governmental action, however, likely varies by industry and
culture and requires additional research.

F. Nested Enterprises
According to Professor Ostrom, "When common-pool resources
that are being managed by a group are part of a larger set of resource
systems, an eighth design principle is usually present in robust
systems. The nested enterprise principle is that governance activities
are organized in multiple layers of related governance regimes." 266
Just as this multilevel system is imperative for environmental
governance in large ecological systems with distinct local
dynamics, 267 so too is it essential for promoting human rights in
business. Though most applicable to common-pool resources, this
principle is nonetheless relevant to human rights in business as it

Id. at 121.
262.
See, e.g., supra Part II.B.5.i.
263.
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posits that larger institutions are important for "govern[ing] the
interdependencies among smaller [governance] units,"2 68 highlighting
the need for effective multistakeholder governance at the national
and international levels. Such a system of governance would assist in
"handling some problems at a very small scale," such as local labor
code violations, "and other problems at ever larger scales," 269
potentially including common industry codes of conduct consistent
with the PRR Framework. As described in Part III.B., the conflict
minerals regime is moving in this direction; however, substantial
progress still needs to be made.
An effective polycentric management system for business and
human rights would consist of a system of nested enterprises that
would use law and norms, market-based incentives, self-regulation,
public-private partnerships, and multilateral collaboration-some of
which are alluded to in Professor Ostrom's principles-to promote
human rights in business. Heavy-handed efforts to crowd out such
bottom-up initiatives, such as the Norms discussed in Part II, should
thus be avoided, and multitype, multisector, and multiscale
initiatives designed to instill the PRR Framework should be preferred
in an effort to make the Guiding Principles a reality and eventually,
perhaps, even a business necessity.
V. CONCLUSION
SRSG Ruggie and others claim that the PRR Framework and the
Guiding Principles create a system of polycentric governance. The
implications of what distinguishes a polycentric governance regime
from a state-based, monocentric governance regime have not been
adequately explored in the literature addressing business and human
rights. Legal scholars tend to view the polycentrism of the PRR
Framework through the lens of international law; however,
international relations, political science, and institutional design
scholars have explicated and applied the concept far beyond its
simple application in federalist legal systems. The interplay among
the state's responsibility to protect against human rights abuses,
business's responsibility to respect human rights, and both state and
nonstate actors' duty to address and remedy human rights risks and
violations, as SRSG Ruggie has described them, provides a fertile
ground for applying that broader polycentric governance literature.
By providing a broad description of the characteristics and literature
surrounding polycentric governance systems and giving an extended
case example of one such nascent regime, this Article has set the
stage for a more nuanced application and expansion of the IAD
268.
269.

Id.
Id.
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framework, which was briefly outlined in Part IV. Sophisticated
fieldwork and empirical analyses can help ensure that the
appropriate development and implementation of the PRR Framework
and the Guiding Principles will result in a truly effective polycentric
system of governance.
To that end, there is a possible natural experiment in the
emerging polycentric governance regime that is focused on stemming
human rights abuses in the DRC related to conflict minerals. This
Article lays out a case study of that nascent governance system. The
conflict minerals regime is an intriguing early application of many of
the norms and values that animate the PRR Framework and Guiding
Principles. It has to grapple with the challenges unique to doing
business in a conflict-affected area. It attempts to skirt the concerns
that accompany the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction over
actors engaged in potentially harmful acts beyond the boundaries of
the home state by regulating domestic actors in a way that has ripple
effect implications in foreign jurisdictions. It has done so by
incorporating the due diligence norm of the second pillar of the PRR
Framework by requiring reporting and disclosure of foreign activities
and incorporating SRSG Ruggie's know and show mantra. It
implicates the responsibility of state actors to be cognizant of their
human rights risks when doing business with business. It has also
relied upon a variety of nonstate actors, who are engaged at various
levels and scales, to fill out the regime and implement the traceability
and due diligence norms. As such, its success (or failure) may augur
well (or ill) for the future of the PRR Framework and Guiding
Principles as a polycentric approach to regulating business and
human rights.
Still, it is worth considering whether the conflict minerals regime
has been hindered by the central position occupied by § 1502 of the
Dodd-Frank Act. As the driver of much of the above-described activity
in the conflict minerals space, perhaps the system is more
hierarchical than a truly polycentric regime ought to be. If § 1502
dominates and demands the focus and efforts of the other actors in
the network, those actors are then unable to be truly creative in their
approach to the problem and are robbed of the ability to make their
own rules and develop their own norms within their respective
domains of influence. As such, instead of the problem-solving
Professor Black ascribes to polycentric governance systems, 270
perhaps the conflict minerals regime has come to be defined by
§ 1502's particular solution to the problem. In other words, it is
important to determine whether-as occurred in laboratory
experiments with externally imposed rules intended to maximize

270.
See Black, supra note 43, at 137-38 (noting that polycentric governance
systems are typically defined by solving a problem rather than by implementing a
particular solution).
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joint returns 2 7 1-§ 1502 has crowded out alternative creative and
cooperative behaviors that would have emerged but for the mandate
of an influential state actor. For example, perhaps § 1502 has
entrenched the OECD Due Diligence Guidance as the singular
standard by which conflict minerals due diligence will be conducted,
even though other local, regional, national, or international schemes
might have developed alternative schemes that are more appropriate
to their domain of influence.
On the other hand, perhaps § 1502 provided the vital catalyst to
spur cooperative efforts to address the conflict minerals problem.
None of the actors described above, save the directly regulated
reporting companies, are beholden to Congress under § 1502. And
Congress is reliant on these actors for the due diligence requirement
to succeed. Without the OECD Due Diligence Guidance, for instance,
there would be no standard by which the conflict minerals reports
could be audited. While the trade groups were no doubt spurred into
quick action by the legislation, they have been free from interference
from state mandate as to their development of strategies for conflictfree smelter certification systems and other traceability initiativessubjects much more within their domain of influence and expertise
than Congress's.
This area is ripe for careful application of rigorous theoretical
and practical work on the optimum design of a polycentric governance
system. If the PRR Framework, as filled out by the Guiding
Principles, realizes its promise as an example and progenitor of
polycentric governance, then the international community could be on
the cusp of a new era of conceptualizing business and human rights
with profound and far-reaching implications, both within and beyond
the conflict mineral context.
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